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Myanmar	   is	   in	   the	  midst	   of	   a	  major	   political/economic	   transition.	   	   After	   years	   of	  
repressive	   rule	   under	   a	   harsh	   military	   regime,	   the	   country	   is	   moving	   towards	  
liberalism.	   	   At	   the	   behest	   of	   the	   domestic	   and	   foreign	   liberal	   pressure,	   the	  
foundations	   of	   liberalism	   including	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   democracy,	   and	   open	  markets	  
are	   taking	   shape	   in	   Myanmar.	   	   This	   paper	   demonstrates	   the	   lack	   of	   agency	   that	  
Myanmar,	  both	  as	  a	  state	  and	  for	  the	  citizens	  within	  the	  state,	  maintains	  during	  this	  
transition.	   	   This	   lack	   of	   agency	   is	   due,	   in	   part,	   to	   the	   neoliberal	   interpretation	   of	  
liberalism	   and	   its	   founding	   tenets.	   	   Utilizing	   Roberto	   Unger	   and	   Susan	   Marks’s	  
theories	   of	   “False	   Necessity”	   and	   “False	   Contingency,”	   I	   will	   demonstrate	   how	  
international	   institutions	   and	   ideologies	   are	   propagated	   and	   forced	   on	  Myanmar.	  	  
The	   belief	   in	   these	   ideologies	   and	   institutions	   creates	   pressures	   and	   imposes	  
limitations	   on	   the	   systems	   that	   they	   influence	   in	  Myanmar.	   	   These	   pressures	   and	  
limits,	   in	   turn,	   create	  a	   lack	  of	   true	  agency	   in	   the	   transition	   that	  Myanmar	  and	   its	  
people	   are	   experiencing.	   	   I	   begin	   by	   first	   exploring	   the	   general	   liberal	   thought	   in	  
regards	   to	   transition.	   	   I	   then	  demonstrate	   the	   false	  contingencies	   that	  a	  neoliberal	  
understanding	   on	   the	   liberal	   tenets	   reflects.	   	   I	   apply	   this	   dynamic	   to	   actual	  
circumstances	  in	  Myanmar	  as	  a	  case.	   	  The	  thesis	  concludes	  with	  the	  exploration	  of	  
the	   concept	   of	   false	   contingency	   on	   Myanmar’s	   transition	   to	   democratization,	  
neoliberalizing	  markets,	  and	  its	  embrace	  of	  human	  rights.	  
	   	  




I	  would	  to	  extend	  a	  special	  thanks	  to	  Hani	  Sayed,	  Diana	  Van	  Bogaert	  and	  the	  AUC	  
Law	  Department	  for	  the	  inspiration,	  help	  and	  conversation.	  
	   	  
	   v	  
TABLE	  OF	  CONTENTS	  
	  
I. Introduction	  …………….………….………………………………………	  
II. A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Modern	  Myanmar……………………………...	  
III. Liberal	  Critique	  of	  Transition	  ……………………………………….	  
A. Neoliberal	  Foundation	  for	  Transition	  ………………………	  
1. Rule	  of	  Law	  ……………………………………………………	  
2. Democracy	  and	  a	  Free	  Market	  Economy	  …………	  
B. The	  Liberal	  Critique	  of	  Myanmar	  ……………………………..	  
1. Law	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Myanmar	  ……………………	  
2. Free	  Markets	  in	  Myanmar	  ………………………………	  
3. Human	  Rights	  in	  Myanmar	  …………………………….	  
IV. The	  False	  Contingency	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Transition	  on	  Poor	  
States	  ………………………………………………………………………….	  
A. False	  Necessity	  and	  False	  Contingency	  …………………….	  
1. False	  Necessity	  and	  its	  Narratives	  of	  Progress	  ..	  
2. False	  Contingency	  ………………………………………….	  
B. Rule	  of	  Law,	  Democracy	  and	  Free	  Markets	  ……………….	  
1.	  	  The	  Neoliberal	  Package	  …………………………………	  
C. False	  Contingencies	  of	  the	  Neoliberal	  Package	  ………….	  
1. False	  Contingencies	  of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	  …………...	  
2. False	  Contingencies	  of	  Democratization	  ………….	  
3. False	  Contingencies	  of	  Free	  Markets	  ……………….	  
V. Myanmar	  and	  its	  False	  Contingencies:	  Freedom	  and	  
Constraint	  …………………………………………………………………...	  
A. The	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  Democratization	  in	  
Myanmar	  ………………………………………………………………..	  
B. The	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  Myanmar’s	  Neoliberalizing	  
Markets	  ………………………………………………………………….	  
C. The	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Myanmar	  	  


































I.	  	  Introduction	  
	  
By	  merely	  glancing	  at	  the	  headlines	  of	  any	  world	  news	  section,	  one	  can	  easily	  
recognize	  the	  importance	  of	  political	  and	  economic	  transitions.	  	  Their	  salience	  is	  
undeniable	  when	  examining	  the	  current	  media	  attention	  given	  to	  them,	  whether	  in	  
the	  Middle	  East,	  North	  Africa	  or	  elsewhere.	  	  Transition	  is	  a	  constant	  and	  often	  the	  
focal	  point	  of	  global	  politics.	  	  It	  is	  a	  seemingly	  irreversible	  process	  that	  can	  open	  the	  
door	  to	  potentially	  unlimited	  contingencies.	  	  This	  project	  is	  very	  much	  about	  the	  
process	  of	  transition	  and	  its	  contingencies.	  	  It	  is	  about	  what	  a	  political/economic	  
transition	  means	  and	  looks	  like	  today.	  	  It	  is	  about	  the	  freedom	  and	  constraints	  a	  
state	  that	  is	  going	  through	  a	  transition	  realistically	  endures.	  	  This	  project	  is	  not	  
about	  what	  succeeds	  after	  a	  transition	  has	  taken	  place.	  	  It	  offers	  no	  critique	  of	  what	  
systems	  are	  best	  for	  a	  particular	  state,	  and	  it	  offers	  no	  judgment	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  
any	  transition.	  	  The	  focus	  is	  singularly	  on	  transition	  itself.	  	  	  
The	  underlying	  assumption	  is	  that	  a	  transition	  inhabits	  a	  time	  and	  space	  in	  
which	  an	  entity,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  this	  paper	  a	  state,	  has,	  or	  should	  have,	  the	  agency	  to	  
decide	  for	  itself	  which	  systems	  and	  institutions	  best	  suit	  it.	  	  However,	  this	  
assumption	  is	  arguably	  contradicted	  by	  the	  reality	  that	  hegemonic	  states	  and	  
organizations	  posit	  their	  political/economic	  power.	  	  History	  has	  shown	  that	  
transition	  has	  often	  been	  a	  time	  when	  a	  particular	  dynamic	  of	  power	  is	  enacted	  
against	  the	  weak	  transitioning	  state	  by	  more	  powerful	  entities.1	  	  This	  paper	  looks	  at	  
this	  dynamic	  in	  the	  very	  contemporary	  setting	  of	  Myanmar	  and	  its	  relationship	  to	  
the	  hegemonic	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  and	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  states	  behind	  
these	  organizations.	  	  	  
I	  posit	  that	  a	  state,	  such	  as	  Myanmar,	  has	  very	  little	  realistic	  agency	  in	  the	  
decisions	  it	  makes	  during	  its	  current	  political/economic	  transition.	  	  This	  is	  due	  to	  a	  
great	  many	  factors,	  but	  there	  appears	  to	  be	  a	  power	  dynamic	  at	  play	  that	  does	  not	  
allow	  Myanmar,	  and	  subsequently	  its	  people,	  to	  practice	  their	  own	  agency	  in	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  See	  NAOMI	  KLEIN,	  THE	  SHOCK	  DOCTRINE	  (Penguin	  Books)	  (2007)	  (tracing	  the	  violent	  
political/economic	  transitions	  of	  Latin	  America,	  East	  Europe	  and	  Asia	  under	  the	  powerful	  doctrine	  of	  
neoliberalism).	  
	   2	  
time	  of	  transition.	  	  Myanmar	  is	  situated,	  like	  most	  other	  poor,	  marginalized	  states	  in	  
a	  developed/undeveloped	  dynamic	  in	  which	  much	  of	  its	  agency	  is	  sapped	  by	  its	  
dependency	  on	  the	  systems,	  such	  as	  the	  legal	  or	  economic	  institutions,	  of	  the	  
stronger	  states.	  	  This	  has	  not	  always	  been	  the	  case	  for	  Myanmar.	  	  Until	  this	  current	  
transition,	  Myanmar	  was	  one	  of	  the	  western	  world’s	  outsider	  states	  much	  like	  North	  
Korea	  or	  Iran.	  	  It	  was	  not	  assimilated	  into	  the	  global	  systems	  that	  most	  states	  
adhered	  to,	  and	  its	  politics	  reflected	  an	  isolated,	  non-­‐aligned	  policy.	  	  This	  is	  changing	  
for	  Myanmar	  now	  as	  it	  opens	  up	  to	  the	  western	  hegemony	  in	  economics	  and	  
political	  ideology.	  
This	  project	  does	  not	  mean	  to	  gloss	  over	  the	  many	  horrendous	  details	  of	  
Myanmar’s	  recent	  history.	  	  It	  does	  not	  expunge	  the	  record	  of	  the	  government’s	  
egregious	  actions	  against	  its	  own	  people.	  	  Nor	  does	  this	  project	  qualify	  the	  systems	  
of	  governance	  or	  institutions	  Myanmar	  has	  chosen	  in	  the	  past,	  or	  is	  choosing	  now.	  	  
As	  stated	  above,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  freedoms	  and	  constraints	  of	  the	  current	  
transition	  taking	  place	  in	  Myanmar	  right	  now	  and	  how	  they	  have	  come	  to	  exist.	  	  I	  do	  
not	  offer	  any	  critique	  of	  what	  form	  of	  government	  or	  economy	  is	  best	  for	  Myanmar.	  	  
This	  is	  not	  a	  project	  claiming	  that	  Myanmar	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  pursue	  its	  socialist	  
past,	  or	  that	  a	  liberalist	  future	  will	  fix	  all	  of	  Myanmar’s	  problems.	  	  This	  project’s	  
scope	  is	  about	  the	  degree	  of	  agency	  a	  state	  such	  as	  Myanmar	  has	  in	  a	  
political/economic	  transition.	  
Myanmar	  has	  been	  chosen	  for	  multiple	  reasons.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  currently	  under	  a	  
transition	  that	  began	  in	  2008	  when	  the	  government	  promulgated	  a	  new	  
constitution,2	  and	  it	  is	  still	  underway.	  	  The	  country	  will	  be	  conducting	  another	  round	  
of	  presidential	  elections	  in	  the	  latter	  part	  of	  2015.3	  	  Second,	  its	  undeniably	  unique	  
history	  that	  straddles	  both	  capitalist	  and	  communist	  leanings	  gives	  valuable	  insight	  
into	  a	  transition	  from	  one	  system	  to	  another.	  	  Third,	  Myanmar’s	  position	  in	  terms	  of	  
its	  economy	  is	  valuable	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  the	  ability	  an	  extremely	  poor	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  See	  Xinhua,	  Myanmar	  formally	  announces	  ratification	  of	  new	  constitution	  draft,	  People’s	  Daily	  
Online,	  (May,	  2008)	  available	  at	  http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90851/6421254.html.	  
3	  See,	  Marie	  Lall,	  Nwe	  Nwe	  San,	  Theint	  Theint	  Myat	  and	  Yin	  Nyein	  Aye,	  Myanmar’s	  Ethnic	  Parties	  and	  
the	  2015	  Elections,	  European	  Union	  (2015).	  
	   3	  
nation	  has	  in	  determining	  its	  own	  destiny	  in	  the	  contemporary	  global	  order.	  	  Lastly,	  
Myanmar	  has	  many	  groups	  and	  advocates	  promoting	  change.	  	  They	  are	  particular	  
adherents	  to	  liberal	  models,	  which	  is	  not	  a	  negative	  in	  and	  of	  itself.	  	  However,	  their	  
devotion	  to	  liberalism	  may	  in	  fact	  be	  from	  the	  very	  power	  dynamic	  this	  project	  
wishes	  to	  demonstrate;	  they	  yearn	  to	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  choose	  for	  themselves	  their	  
own	  models,	  but	  the	  systems	  around	  them	  do,	  in	  fact,	  place	  constraints	  and	  pressure	  
on	  them,	  so	  much	  so,	  that	  there	  is	  little	  choice	  to	  be	  had.	  
Myanmar	  lacks	  agency	  in	  its	  transition	  due	  to	  its	  position	  in	  the	  power	  
dynamic	  between	  a	  state	  and	  the	  hegemony	  of	  global	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  or	  
World	  Bank	  and	  their	  universal	  approach.	  	  These	  institutions,	  in	  turn,	  are	  controlled	  
by	  much	  more	  powerful	  states	  such	  as	  the	  US	  or	  EU.	  	  This	  argument	  does	  not	  
necessarily	  require	  Myanmar.	  	  I	  have	  chosen	  it	  because	  the	  argument	  could	  apply	  to	  
any	  number	  of	  poor,	  maligned	  states	  going	  through	  their	  own	  transition	  at	  the	  
mercy	  of	  bigger,	  more	  powerful	  states,	  and	  Myanmar	  has	  been	  chosen	  as	  this	  
project’s	  case.	  	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  this	  lack	  of	  agency	  using	  Susan	  Mark’s	  theory	  of	  
‘False	  Contingency,’	  that	  there	  is	  a	  system	  of	  limits	  and	  pressures	  that	  constrain	  
Roberto	  Unger’s	  ‘False	  Necessity,’	  in	  which	  he	  posits	  that	  there	  are	  a	  limitless	  
number	  of	  potential	  systems	  of	  governance	  and	  economy.4	  	  	  
The	  paper	  begins	  with	  a	  brief	  modern	  history	  of	  Myanmar.	  	  I	  will	  then	  
demonstrate	  an	  overarching	  liberal	  ideology	  regarding	  transition	  and	  the	  
contemporary	  influence	  liberal	  ideologies	  have	  had	  and	  continue	  to	  have	  on	  
Myanmar.	  	  In	  the	  fourth	  chapter	  I	  explore	  both	  Unger’s	  ‘False	  Necessity’	  and	  Marks’s	  
‘False	  Contingency’	  and	  their	  relevance	  to	  the	  freedoms	  and	  constraints	  of	  
transition.	  	  This	  will	  also	  include	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  potential	  misgivings	  of	  the	  liberal	  
approach	  and	  ideology	  to	  transition	  particularly	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  more	  modern	  
approach	  to	  neoliberalism.	  	  Finally,	  in	  the	  fifth	  chapter	  I	  will	  use	  Myanmar	  as	  a	  case	  
study	  to	  demonstrate	  how	  liberalism,	  and	  particularly	  neoliberalism,	  has	  created	  
the	  power	  dynamic	  that	  is	  Marks’s	  ‘False	  Contingency’	  reflected	  in	  Myanmar’s	  
political/economic	  transition.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  See	  ROBERTO	  UNGER,	  FALSE	  NECESSITY,	  (Verso,	  2nd	  edn.	  London,	  2004)	  and	  Susan	  Marks,	  False	  
Contingency,	  Susan	  Marks,	  (Current	  L.	  Prob.	  2009).	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II.	  	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  Modern	  Myanmar	  	  
An	  elementary	  understanding	  of	  Myanmar’s	  modern	  history	  is	  needed	  to	  grasp	  its	  
relevance.	  	  There	  are	  several	  themes	  that	  are	  particularly	  apposite.	  	  First,	  Myanmar	  
is	  a	  state	  that	  has	  traversed	  both	  economies	  of	  capitalism	  and	  socialism	  in	  the	  last	  
60	  years.	  	  Second,	  it	  is	  a	  state	  that	  deliberately	  chose	  nonalignment	  in	  a	  bipolarized	  
world	  during	  the	  communist/capitalist	  divide.	  	  This	  nonalignment	  was	  then	  
transformed	  into	  extreme	  isolation.	  	  Finally,	  the	  result	  of	  this	  was	  a	  military	  led	  state	  
with	  extensive	  socio-­‐economic	  woes.	  	  This	  section	  will	  give	  a	  succinct	  history	  of	  
Myanmar	  since	  WWII	  and	  highlight	  some	  of	  the	  major	  events	  and	  names	  of	  the	  last	  
50	  years.	  
Myanmar,	  formerly	  known	  as	  Burma,	  was	  a	  British	  colonial	  invention.	  	  The	  
British	  were	  present	  for	  a	  relatively	  brief	  time,	  from	  1885	  to	  1937,	  in	  comparison	  to	  
their	  other	  endeavors	  such	  as	  in	  India.5	  	  Myanmar’s	  borders	  were	  unsurprisingly	  
drawn	  up	  by	  the	  UK.	  	  It	  was	  a	  very	  successful	  colony	  by	  economic	  standards	  and	  was	  
a	  major	  exporter	  of	  rice,	  timber	  and	  minerals.6	  	  After	  a	  traumatic	  WWII	  experience	  
in	  which	  the	  colony	  dealt	  with	  both	  British	  and	  Japanese	  occupation,	  Myanmar	  was	  
finally	  given	  its	  own	  sovereignty	  in	  1948.7	  	  Before,	  during	  and	  after	  the	  WWII,	  both	  
communists	  and	  liberals	  were	  present	  in	  Myanmar.	  	  Present	  day	  Myanmarese	  
heroine	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi’s	  father,	  Aung	  San,	  was	  the	  central	  player	  in	  gaining	  
independence	  for	  the	  country.	  	  He	  rode	  the	  fence	  between	  liberalism	  and	  
communism:	  whichever	  best	  suited	  his	  needs	  in	  the	  fight	  for	  independence.8	  	  
Unfortunately,	  Aung	  San	  was	  assassinated	  in	  1947,	  and	  the	  country,	  losing	  its	  
charismatic	  leader,	  was	  left	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  Nu,	  who	  in	  its	  first	  decade	  took	  the	  state	  
down	  a	  liberal	  path	  infused	  with	  Buddhist	  nationalist	  sentiment.9	  
	   In	  1962,	  under	  General	  Ne	  Win,	  the	  country	  changed	  course.	  	  First,	  under	  the	  
banner	  Revolutionary	  Council,	  then	  the	  Burma	  Socialist	  Program	  Party,	  Ne	  Win	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  PETER	  JOHN	  PERRY,	  MYANMAR	  (BURMA)	  SINCE	  1962:	  THE	  FAILURE	  OF	  DEVELOPMENT	  21	  
(Ashgate	  Publishing	  Limited	  2007).	  
6	  Id,	  at	  1.	  
7	  MICHAEL	  W.	  CHARNEY,	  A	  HISTORY	  OF	  MODERN	  BURMA	  71	  (Cambridge	  University	  Press	  2009).	  
8	  See	  Id,	  at	  46-­‐72.	  
9	  Id,	  at	  72.	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his	  military	  controlled	  the	  state	  in	  one	  form	  or	  another	  until	  1988.10	  	  The	  Ne	  Win	  
regime	  utilized	  what	  it	  called	  the	  “The	  Burmese	  Way	  to	  Socialism.”11	  	  It	  was	  in	  fact	  
not	  entirely	  socialist.	  	  The	  peasants	  continued	  to	  be	  the	  producers	  of	  rice,	  
Myanmar’s	  main	  crop,	  and	  the	  state	  was	  to	  oversee	  the	  rice	  trade	  and	  practice	  
procurement.	  	  It	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  based	  on	  cooperation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  
producers,	  but	  it	  failed	  miserably	  due	  to	  state	  incompetence	  and	  greed.	  	  Perry	  
describes	  the	  dynamic	  as	  state	  and	  elite-­‐rewarding	  capitalism.	  12	  	  Politically,	  the	  
ideology	  was	  meant	  to	  be	  democratic	  centralism,	  but	  instead	  developed	  into	  a,	  
“‘centrally	  guided‘	  democracy	  in	  which	  the	  only	  way	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  
activity	  was	  to	  join	  the	  army	  or	  public	  service	  and	  gain	  promotion.	  	  As	  was	  often	  
noted	  compliance,	  conformity	  and	  corruption	  served	  this	  purpose	  better	  than	  ability	  
or	  activity.”13	  	  Beyond	  this,	  the	  military	  proved	  to	  be	  terrible	  administrators	  and	  
never	  utilized	  talent	  and	  skill	  outside	  of	  its	  rank	  and	  file.14	  	  The	  government	  reined	  
in	  dissent	  through	  tactics	  of	  censorship,	  curfew,	  reeducation	  programs	  at	  the	  
university	  and	  monastic	  level,	  and	  arrests.15	  	  	  
An	  essential	  element	  to	  the	  regime	  was	  its	  active	  pursuit	  of	  isolationism.	  	  Ne	  
Win	  himself	  was	  an	  ardent	  believer	  in	  it,	  and	  the	  nation	  developed	  an	  ideology	  of	  
self-­‐help	  and	  self-­‐pay.16	  	  Isolation	  imbued	  nearly	  every	  aspect	  of	  Myanmar	  society	  
including	  ideologies,	  politics	  and	  economics.	  	  Beyond	  isolation	  was	  the	  belief	  in	  
nonalignment	  that	  had	  begun	  in	  the	  1950s	  during	  the	  Cold	  War.17	  	  Myanmar	  was	  to	  
focus	  on	  development	  instead	  of	  the	  distraction	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  In	  fact,	  Myanmar	  
remained	  neutral	  to	  even	  the	  non-­‐alignment	  movement	  itself,	  preferring	  isolation	  
over	  joining	  any	  form	  of	  political	  bloc.18	  	  The	  status	  quo	  of	  quasi-­‐socialist	  Myanmar	  
remained	  with	  certain	  adjustments	  and	  a	  very	  gradual	  shift	  towards	  capitalism	  until	  
the	  democratic	  protests	  of	  1988.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Id,	  at	  107.	  
11	  Perry,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  26.	  
12	  Id,	  at	  27.	  
13	  Id,	  at	  29.	  
14	  Id,	  at	  32.	  
15	  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  115.	  
16	  Perry,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  37.	  
17	  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  79.	  
18	  Id,	  at	  81.	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   The	  protests	  were	  a	  major	  moment	  in	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  Myanmar	  and	  
ushered	  in	  a	  new,	  important	  era.	  	  Students	  largely	  led	  the	  1988	  protests	  making	  
demands	  for	  a	  better	  economy,	  democracy,	  and	  the	  release	  of	  unwarranted	  
prisoners.	  	  The	  number	  of	  demonstrators	  escalated	  rapidly	  and	  grew	  into	  the	  
thousands.	  	  Over	  the	  course	  of	  a	  few	  years	  the	  government	  attempted	  different	  ways	  
to	  pacify	  their	  people	  but	  were	  unsuccessful;	  thousands	  lost	  their	  lives	  and	  even	  
more	  were	  imprisoned	  sometimes	  for	  decades.	  	  Eventually,	  Ne	  Win	  was	  replaced.	  	  
More	  importantly,	  democratic	  elections	  were	  scheduled	  that	  involved	  the	  newly	  
developed	  National	  League	  for	  Democracy	  (NLD),	  which	  is	  still	  in	  operation	  today	  
and	  led	  by	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi.	  	  	  In	  1990	  parliamentary	  elections	  were	  held	  in	  which	  
the	  NLD	  won	  392	  out	  of	  447	  seats.	  	  However,	  the	  newly	  reorganized	  military	  regime,	  
under	  the	  reinvented	  title,	  the	  State	  Law	  and	  Order	  Restoration	  Council	  (SLORC),	  
hijacked	  the	  elections	  and	  put	  the	  country	  on	  a	  course	  of	  indefinite	  democratic	  
transition	  that	  has	  essentially	  lasted	  two	  decades.19	  
	   The	  SLORC	  years	  have	  come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  arguably	  Myanmar’s	  most	  
oppressive	  and	  unfortunate	  years	  to	  date.	  	  	  Through	  not	  recognizing	  multi-­‐party	  
election	  results,	  calling	  for	  constitutional	  reforms	  that	  never	  happened,	  and	  
repressing	  any	  form	  of	  public	  dissent	  by	  means	  of	  military	  tribunals	  capable	  of	  
sentencing	  people	  to	  death,	  life	  imprisonment	  or	  three	  years	  hard	  labor,20	  The	  
SLORC	  held	  onto	  power	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  letting	  the	  Myanmarese	  people	  fall	  further	  
into	  extreme	  poverty.21	  	  It	  is	  during	  these	  years	  that	  Myanmar	  developed	  a	  
significant	  reputation	  for	  egregious	  human	  rights	  abuses	  and	  oppressive	  state	  
control	  involving	  everything	  from	  forced	  labor	  to	  indefinite	  detentions.	  	  “The	  SLORC	  
had	  a	  particular	  view	  of	  how	  the	  future	  of	  the	  country	  should	  be	  shaped.	  	  As	  events	  
would	  soon	  demonstrate,	  this	  view	  was	  hostile	  to	  both	  foreign	  interference	  and	  
democracy,	  which	  in	  the	  Council’s	  eyes	  became	  inextricably	  linked.”22	  Due	  to	  these	  
actions	  committed	  by	  the	  government,	  the	  international	  community,	  namely	  the	  US	  
and	  the	  EU,	  responded	  with	  economic	  sanctions.	  	  The	  EU	  began	  in	  1996	  with	  a	  visa	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19	  Id,	  at	  148-­‐170.	  
20	  Id,	  at	  167.	  
21	  Id,	  at	  170-­‐176.	  
22	  Id,	  at	  173.	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ban	  on	  government	  families	  and	  then	  in	  2007	  with	  an	  export	  ban	  on	  Myanmar	  
timber	  and	  minerals.	  	  The	  US	  began	  its	  sanctions	  regime	  in	  1997	  and	  was	  intensified	  
after	  the	  Burma	  Freedom	  and	  Democracy	  Act,	  which	  banned	  all	  imports	  from	  
Myanmar	  to	  the	  US.23	  	  However,	  since	  2008,	  when	  a	  new	  constitution	  was	  ratified,	  
and	  in	  2010,	  when	  a	  new	  quasi-­‐civilian	  government	  was	  put	  in	  place	  and	  began	  the	  
reform	  process,	  the	  West	  has	  reengaged	  with	  Myanmar.	  	  This	  brings	  us	  to	  the	  
current	  argument	  of	  this	  project	  that	  Myanmar	  has	  a	  lack	  of	  agency	  in	  its	  own	  
transition.	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23	  Klaus	  E.	  Meyer	  and	  Htwe	  Htwe	  Thein,	  Business	  under	  adverse	  home	  country	  institutions:	  The	  case	  of	  
international	  sanctions	  against	  Myanmar	  (49	  J.	  of	  WORLD	  Bus.	  156,	  160	  (2014).	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III:	  A	  Liberal	  Critique	  of	  Transition	  
In	  the	  last	  30	  to	  40	  years,	  especially	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Soviet	  bloc,	  the	  discourse	  
over	  transition	  has	  been	  steered	  in	  a	  singularly	  liberal	  direction.	  	  	  With	  the	  failure	  of	  
the	  communist	  systems,	  has	  come	  a	  sort	  of	  vindication	  of	  all	  things	  liberal	  with	  the	  
US	  and	  Western	  Europe	  leading	  the	  charge.	  	  Authors	  such	  as	  Francis	  Fukuyama	  
declared	  this	  new	  world	  order	  the	  “End	  of	  History”24	  and	  a	  ubiquitous	  political	  
belief	  in	  all	  things	  democratic,	  rule	  of	  law	  oriented	  and	  capitalist	  began.	  	  There	  was	  
no	  longer	  the	  need	  to	  debate	  which	  system	  was	  better	  for	  a	  society.	  	  The	  
conversations	  over	  global	  order	  had	  shifted.	  	  All	  of	  these	  failed	  governments	  
required	  an	  overhauling	  of	  virtually	  all	  their	  public	  systems,	  which	  made	  transition	  
the	  new	  pressing	  matter.	  	  	  
	   In	  this	  time	  of	  great	  need,	  the	  global	  institutions	  of	  the	  West	  seized	  their	  
opportunity	  to	  transplant	  their	  systems	  into	  these	  transitioning	  states	  in	  Eastern	  
Europe	  and	  Asia.	  	  Many	  of	  these	  governments,	  such	  as	  Poland	  or	  earlier	  Chile	  and	  
Argentina,	  were	  hit	  with	  what	  has	  been	  termed	  the	  “shock	  treatment,”25	  in	  which	  
hardline	  governments,	  such	  as	  Pinochet	  and	  his	  supporters,	  enforced	  an	  intensive	  
economic	  overhaul	  under	  the	  supervision	  of	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  his	  Chicago	  
Boys.26	  	  This	  ‘shock	  treatment’	  involved	  a	  radical	  embracing	  of	  neoliberal	  ideologies	  
including	  extensive	  free	  trade,	  a	  hands-­‐off	  state	  policy,	  and	  the	  massive	  privatization	  
of	  enterprises.27	  	  This	  new	  form	  of	  private/public,	  political/economic	  relationship	  
gradually	  took	  hold	  and	  by	  the	  time	  the	  communist	  world	  was	  finished,	  the	  
Western-­‐led	  financial	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF	  were	  in	  full	  
power	  to	  command	  the	  transitions.	  	  
	   This	  neoliberal	  agenda	  established	  through	  hegemony	  was	  arranged	  to	  guide	  
the	  transitioning	  states	  through	  their	  individual	  processes,	  but	  with	  a	  universal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24See	  FRANCIS	  FUKUYAMA,	  END	  OF	  HISTORY	  AND	  THE	  LAST	  MAN	  (Free	  Press	  1992)	  (referring	  to	  
the	  end	  of	  communism	  in	  the	  1990s	  and	  the	  result	  of	  which	  meant	  liberalism	  is	  the	  endpoint	  for	  
humanity’s	  social	  evolution).	  
25	  Klein,	  supra	  note	  1,	  at	  73-­‐116.	  
26	  Id.	  
27	  Id.	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roadmap.28	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  what	  exactly	  the	  neoliberal	  ideology	  entails.	  	  It	  
focuses	  on	  the	  strict	  adherence	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  which	  is	  the	  foundation	  on	  which	  
democracy	  and	  free	  market	  capitalism	  is	  built.	  	  	  
	  
A.	  A	  Neoliberal	  Foundation	  for	  Transition	  
Neoliberalism	  is	  the	  all-­‐encompassing	  term	  given	  to	  the	  political/economic	  dynamic	  
that	  has	  been	  in	  action	  since	  the	  late	  seventies.	  The	  neoliberal	  experience	  is	  built	  
upon	  the	  pillars	  of	  general	  liberal	  thought:	  democracy,	  capitalism	  and	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  
The	  fundamental	  difference	  from	  liberalism	  is	  that	  neoliberalism	  takes	  a	  hardline	  
approach	  that	  severely	  limits	  a	  state’s	  capacity	  to	  engage	  in	  the	  economy.	  	  It	  does	  
this	  by	  separating	  the	  discourse	  that	  goes	  on	  between	  politics	  and	  the	  economy.	  	  
Roberto	  Unger	  offers	  this	  extensive	  definition	  of	  its	  central	  values:	  	  
Neoliberalism	  is	  the	  program	  committed	  to	  orthodox	  macroeconomic	  
stabilization,	  especially	  through	  fiscal	  balance,	  achieved	  more	  by	  
containment	  of	  public	  spending	  than	  by	  increases	  in	  the	  tax	  take;	  to	  
liberalization	  in	  the	  form	  of	  increasing	  integration	  into	  the	  world	  
trading	  system	  and	  its	  established	  rules;	  to	  privatization,	  understood	  
both	  more	  narrowly	  as	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  government	  from	  
production	  and	  more	  generally	  as	  the	  adoption	  of	  standard	  Western	  
private	  law;	  and	  to	  the	  deployment	  of	  compensatory	  social	  policies	  
(“social-­‐safety	  nets”)	  designed	  to	  counteract	  the	  unequalizing	  effects	  
of	  the	  other	  planks	  in	  the	  orthodox	  platform.29	  	  
	  
It	  is	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  a	  universalist,	  globalizing	  influence	  in	  all	  states’	  politics,	  
economies	  and	  legal	  structures	  best	  serves	  all	  economies	  and	  inevitably	  develops	  
the	  world’s	  states.	  
	   Thus,	  the	  ideals	  of	  liberalism	  have	  been	  greatly	  propagated	  by	  the	  methods	  of	  
neoliberalism.	  	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  of	  vindication	  surrounding	  these	  methods	  and	  ideals	  
due	  to	  the	  level	  of	  support	  given	  them	  by	  the	  major	  hegemonic	  states	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28	  See	  SUNDHYA	  PAHUJA,	  DECOLONIZING	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW:	  DEVELOPMENT,	  ECONOMIC	  
GROWTH	  AND	  THE	  POLITICS	  OF	  UNIVERSALITY	  (2011),	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1743269,	  
(arguing	  that	  international	  law	  is	  based	  of	  a	  universal	  prescription	  for	  development	  and	  economic	  
growth).	  
29	  ROBERTO	  MANGABEIRA	  UNGER,	  DEMOCRACY	  REALIZED:	  THE	  PROGRESSIVE	  ALTERNATIVE	  53	  
(Verso)	  (1998).	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institutions	  of	  the	  global	  order.	  	  The	  flagships	  of	  (neo)liberalism	  have	  been	  and	  
continue	  to	  be	  the	  IMF,	  World	  Bank,	  WTO,	  and	  the	  UN,	  which	  are	  all	  largely	  led	  by	  
the	  powerful	  states	  of	  North	  America	  and	  Western	  Europe.	  	  These	  hegemonic	  
powers	  and	  institutions	  carry	  out	  their	  global	  activities	  under	  a	  belief	  resembling	  
Rawl’s	  ‘duty	  of	  assistance.’30	  	  For	  Rawls,	  there	  is	  a,	  “well-­‐ordered	  peoples’	  duty	  to	  
assist	  burdened	  societies	  in	  establishing	  just	  (or	  decent)	  institutions	  [which]	  is	  one	  
part	  of	  [the]	  project	  of	  transition,	  a	  project	  which	  we	  are	  bound	  to	  engage	  in	  by	  the	  
natural	  duty	  of	  justice.”31	  	  The	  natural	  duty	  of	  justice	  demonstrates	  the	  underlying	  
belief	  that	  it	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  this	  hegemony	  to	  assist,	  as	  it	  can,	  in	  exporting	  its	  just	  and	  
successful	  mechanisms	  of	  society	  to	  less	  developed	  and	  maligned	  regions	  of	  the	  
world.	  	  The	  time	  and	  place	  to	  accomplish	  this	  is	  within	  these	  undeveloped	  countries’	  
transitions.	  
	   The	  result	  of	  these	  beliefs	  in	  neoliberalism	  and	  the	  duty	  of	  assistance	  has	  
come	  to	  be	  known	  as	  globalization.	  	  Globalization	  is	  the	  neoliberal’s	  term	  for	  
spreading	  their	  system	  around	  the	  world.	  	  Its	  adherents	  are	  fervent	  in	  their	  belief	  in	  
its	  potential	  for	  good.	  	  Thomas	  Friedman,	  a	  major	  proponent	  of	  globalization,	  
demonstrates	  his	  propensity	  for	  it	  saying,	  “The	  spread	  of	  free	  markets	  and	  
democracy	  around	  the	  world	  is	  permitting	  more	  people	  everywhere	  to	  turn	  their	  
aspirations	  into	  achievements.”32	  	  These	  aspirations	  and	  achievements	  of	  
globalization	  are	  meant	  to	  open	  the	  doors	  of	  these	  transitioning	  States	  to	  unlimited	  
potential.	  	  Scholar	  Karin	  van	  Marle	  highlights	  both	  the	  broad	  scope	  of	  its	  embrace	  
and	  the	  faith	  in	  its	  ability	  to	  open	  the	  doors	  of	  limitless	  contingencies:	  
Transition	  should	  encompass	  not	  only	  institutional	  change	  
(evolution)	  but	  also	  the	  change	  of	  particular	  individuals	  within	  society	  
(transformation).	  	  The	  process	  of	  transition	  should	  however	  protect	  
an	  individual’s	  right	  to	  imagine	  him/herself	  freely	  without	  the	  
limitations	  or	  restrictions	  of	  strict	  and	  fixed	  concepts	  of	  identity	  [.	  .	  
.]The	  contingency	  and	  fluidity	  of	  individual	  transition	  should	  also	  
influence	  institutional	  approaches	  to	  transition	  [.	  .	  .]	  Both	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30	  See	  Caleb	  Young,	  Rawls’s	  Duty	  of	  Assistance:	  Transitional	  not	  Humanitarian	  or	  Sufficientarian	  
(Nuffield’s	  Working	  Papers	  Series	  in	  Politics,	  2012).	  
31	  Id,	  at	  3.	  
32AMY	  CHUA,	  WORLD	  ON	  FIRE:	  EXPORTING	  FREE	  MARKET	  DEMOCRACY	  BREEDS	  ETHNIC	  HATRED	  
AND	  GLOBAL	  INSTABILITY	  9	  (Doubleday,	  2003)	  quoting	  THOMAS	  L.	  FRIEDMAN,	  THE	  LEXUS	  AND	  
THE	  OLIVE	  TREE	  ix,	  svi,	  12	  (Anchor	  Books,	  2000).	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transition	  of	  a	  society	  on	  a	  structural	  or	  institutional	  level	  and	  the	  
transition	  of	  an	  individual	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  contingent,	  fluid	  and	  
open.33	  
	  
Globalization	  is	  built	  on	  a	  firm	  belief	  in	  the	  cosmopolitan	  -­‐	  the	  idea	  that	  with	  enough	  
effort,	  humanity	  can	  achieve	  its	  most	  coherent	  and	  effective	  form	  of	  governance	  
through	  universal	  principles.	  	  Marle	  is	  writing	  about	  transcending	  into	  the	  
cosmopolitan.	  	  By	  harnessing	  Universalist	  principles,	  humanity	  will	  find	  its	  freedom	  
and	  most	  effective	  means	  of	  governance.	  
	  
1.	  Rule	  of	  Law	  
The	  backbone	  of	  achieving	  a	  globalized,	  cosmopolitan	  world	  is	  an	  adherence	  to	  the	  
rule	  of	  law.	  	  Once	  humanity	  can	  agree	  upon	  a	  set	  of	  universalist	  principles	  that	  all	  
can	  abide	  by,	  the	  other	  pillars	  of	  liberalism	  take	  shape	  and	  assist	  the	  marginalized	  
states	  of	  the	  world	  such	  as	  Myanmar.	  	  It	  is	  for	  this	  reason	  that	  certain	  scholars	  
promote	  international	  legal	  assistance	  in	  the	  name	  of	  cosmopolitanism.34	  	  	  This	  legal	  
assistance	  is	  meant	  to	  open	  the	  doors	  to	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  “beneficial”	  structures	  
that	  should	  ideally	  transform	  a	  country	  such	  as	  Myanmar	  into	  a	  peaceful,	  productive	  
state.	  	  It	  only	  requires	  an	  initial	  sacrifice	  of	  a	  portion	  of	  each	  state’s	  inherent	  right	  to	  
sovereignty.	  	  For	  example,	  when	  a	  state	  signs	  an	  international	  convention,	  it	  is	  
obligated	  to	  adhere	  to	  its	  decree	  even	  if	  the	  decree	  limits	  the	  freedom	  of	  the	  state’s	  
actions	  regarding	  anything	  from	  trade	  to	  humanitarian	  law.	  	  Hafner-­‐Burton,	  
Mansfield	  and	  Pevhouse	  demonstrate	  the	  incentives	  democratizing	  states	  are	  
offered	  to	  surrender	  a	  portion	  of	  their	  sovereignty	  to	  consolidate	  their	  
democratization.	  One	  is	  embracing	  liberal	  policies,	  namely	  human	  rights.	  	  The	  
incentives	  to	  do	  so	  are	  to	  prove	  their	  commitment	  to	  “lock	  in	  liberal	  policies”	  and	  to	  
“respond	  to	  inducements	  from	  more	  established	  democracies.”	  	  “Joining	  a	  human	  
rights	  institution	  that	  extracts	  high	  costs	  enhances	  the	  credibility	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33	  Karin	  van	  Marle,	  The	  multiplicity	  of	  transition,	  35	  Comp.	  &	  Int’l	  L.	  J.	  S.	  AFRICA.	  65,	  67	  (2002).	  
34	  Andrew	  Morgan,	  A	  Remarkable	  Occurrence:	  Progress	  for	  Civil	  Society	  in	  an	  “Open”	  Myanmar,	  23	  Pac.	  
Rim	  L.	  and	  P.	  J.	  495,	  498	  (2014).	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government’s	  commitment	  to	  democratic	  reform	  and	  sends	  a	  credible	  signal	  to	  both	  
domestic	  and	  foreign	  audiences	  that	  it	  is	  serious	  about	  such	  change.”35	  
	   A	  major	  proponent	  of	  such	  transitions	  under	  the	  rule	  of	  international	  law	  is	  
the	  World	  Bank.	  	  It	  has	  been	  funding	  and	  assisting	  states	  to	  rebuild	  themselves	  
essentially	  since	  its	  inception.	  	  The	  multinational	  financial	  institution	  is	  heavily	  
involved	  in	  the	  global	  discourse	  over	  development	  and	  regularly	  weighs	  in	  on	  the	  
discussion	  through	  its	  various	  publications	  and	  reports.	  	  The	  bank	  strongly	  
advocates	  for	  development	  to	  take	  place	  under	  the	  ever-­‐vigilant	  eye	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  
law.	  	  “The	  development	  process	  must	  be	  comprehensive,	  and	  [.	  .	  .]	  legal	  and	  judicial	  
reforms	  are	  critical	  components	  of	  that	  process.	  	  Indeed,	  legal	  and	  judicial	  reform	  is	  
one	  of	  the	  main	  pillars	  of	  the	  Comprehensive	  Development	  Framework.”36	  	  The	  
World	  Bank,	  since	  the	  nineties,	  institutes	  a	  series	  of	  assessments	  and	  diagnostics	  on	  
the	  countries	  with	  which	  it	  is	  engaged.	  	  The	  assessment	  examines,	  “different	  aspects	  
of	  the	  administration	  of	  justice,	  including	  court	  and	  case	  administration;	  selection,	  
promotion,	  and	  disciplining	  of	  judges;	  training	  of	  judges,	  lawyers	  and	  law	  students;	  
access	  to	  justice	  and	  its	  gender	  dimension;	  and	  alternative	  dispute	  resolution	  
mechanisms.”37	  	  The	  Bank	  recognizes	  the	  ability	  of	  law	  to	  influence	  the	  distribution	  
and	  benefits	  of	  economic	  growth.	  	  The	  institution	  promotes	  the	  notion	  that	  law	  must	  
be	  used	  to	  bolster	  other	  societal	  structures	  such	  as	  politics	  and	  the	  economy	  to	  
protect	  the	  vulnerable	  against	  starvation,	  violence,	  disease,	  and	  poverty.38	  	  To	  do	  so	  
requires:	  
Transparency	  and	  accountability	  in	  government,	  public	  participation	  
and	  legal	  institutions	  and	  processes	  that	  are	  not	  only	  effective	  and	  
efficient	  but	  also	  provide	  equitable	  remedies	  for	  all	  in	  society.	  	  A	  well	  
functioning	  legal	  and	  judicial	  system	  is	  critical	  both	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  
as	  well	  as	  a	  means	  to	  facilitate	  and	  leverage	  the	  achievement	  of	  other	  
development	  objectives.39	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35	  Emilie	  M.	  Hafner-­‐Burton,	  Edward	  D.	  Mansfield	  and	  Jon	  C.W.	  Pevehouse,	  Human	  Rights	  Institutions,	  
Sovereignty	  Costs	  and	  Democrtization,	  45	  Brit.	  J.	  of	  Pol.	  Sci.	  1,	  2	  (2015)	  (first	  published	  Cambridge	  Uni.	  
Press	  2013).	  
36	  Legal	  Vice	  Presidency,	  Initiatives	  in	  Legal	  and	  Judicial	  Reform,	  The	  World	  Bank	  1	  (2004).	  
37	  Id,	  at	  5.	  
38	  Id.	  
39	  Id.	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With	  a	  foundation	  built	  on	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  the	  World	  Bank	  should	  be	  able	  to	  carry	  
out	  its	  mission	  to	  assist	  the	  world’s	  transitioning	  states	  through	  their	  process.	  
	  
2.	  Democracy	  and	  a	  Free	  Market	  Economy	  
Legal	  reform	  may	  be	  the	  backbone	  of	  the	  liberal	  transition,	  but	  the	  fundamental	  
impetus	  behind	  reform	  is	  certainly	  one	  of	  democratization	  and	  free	  market	  
capitalism.	  	  There	  is	  a	  wealth	  of	  literature	  regarding	  democratic	  transitions	  
especially	  since	  the	  fall	  of	  the	  Berlin	  wall.	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  has	  weighed	  in	  heavily	  
on	  these	  transitions	  on	  how	  to	  make	  the	  change	  from	  a	  planned,	  centralized	  society	  
to	  a	  liberal,	  market-­‐based,	  democratic	  system.40	  	  The	  planned	  economies	  had	  failed,	  
so	  liberal	  answers	  became	  axiomatic.	   	  
	   The	  long-­‐held	  ideology	  that	  democracy	  and	  free	  markets	  go	  hand-­‐in-­‐hand	  is	  
still	  as	  fundamental	  a	  belief	  today	  as	  it	  was	  25	  years	  ago	  when	  the	  planned	  
governments	  of	  the	  Soviet	  Bloc	  were	  transitioning.	  	  The	  international	  financial	  
institutions,	  the	  UN,	  North	  American	  and	  Western	  European	  leaders,	  and	  many	  
academics	  still	  espouse	  these	  ideas	  and	  attempt	  to	  evince	  the	  relationship	  between	  
the	  systems	  quantitatively.41	  	  Daniel	  Treisman	  is	  a	  case	  in	  point:	  “Since	  Lipset	  
(1959),	  many	  scholars	  have	  held	  that	  as	  countries	  develop	  economically	  they	  tend	  
to	  become	  more	  democratic	  [.	  .	  .]	  Moreover,	  a	  variety	  of	  plausible	  mechanisms—
from	  the	  spread	  of	  education	  and	  mass	  media	  to	  growing	  tolerance	  and	  social	  
differentiation—seemed	  likely	  to	  render	  citizens	  of	  richer	  societies	  both	  more	  eager	  
to	  participate	  and	  harder	  to	  control.”	  	  Treisman	  continues	  with	  his	  overview	  of	  
history	  of	  the	  connection	  of	  democracy	  and	  income.	  	  	  Recently,	  he	  demonstrates,	  
scholars	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  maybe	  not	  so	  causal,	  but	  instead,	  democracy	  and	  income	  
expand	  together.42	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40	  See	  The	  World	  Bank,	  World	  Development	  Report:	  From	  Plan	  to	  Market,	  Ox.	  Uni.	  Press	  (1996).	  
41	  See	  Daniel	  Treisman,	  Income,	  Democracy,	  and	  the	  Cunning	  Reason,	  (2011),	  Fabrice	  Murtin	  and	  
Romain	  Wacziarg,	  The	  democratic	  Transition,	  (2013),	  Yi	  Feng	  and	  Paul	  J.	  Zak,	  The	  Determinants	  of	  
Democratic	  Transitions,	  (1999),	  Siddharth	  Swaminathan,	  Time,	  Power,	  and	  Democratic	  Transitions,	  
(1999).	  
42	  Daniel	  Treisman,	  Income,	  Democracy,	  and	  the	  Cunning	  Reason	  4	  (National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  
Research	  Working	  Paper	  Series,	  Paper	  No.	  17132,	  2011).	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Various	  aspects	  of	  modernization	  may	  affect	  politics	  with	  a	  lag.	  	  Rising	  
literacy	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  education	  will	  create	  pressure	  for	  more	  
accountable	  government	  only	  after	  newly	  literate	  and	  educated	  
groups	  become	  politically	  aware	  and	  develop	  organizational	  skills	  [.	  .	  
.]	  The	  demand	  for	  democracy	  and	  the	  readiness	  of	  society	  to	  sustain	  it	  
have	  a	  greater	  impact	  in	  periods	  after	  change	  occurs	  in	  a	  country’s	  top	  
leadership.43	  
	  
Treisman	  demonstrates	  how	  the	  social	  benefits	  that	  arise	  from	  a	  market	  economy	  
have	  a	  positive	  effect	  on	  the	  democratization	  of	  the	  country.	  	  Murtin	  and	  Wacziarg	  
come	  to	  essentially	  the	  same	  conclusion	  while	  looking	  largely	  at	  industrialization	  
and	  modernization.44	  	  They	  also	  note,	  “a	  strong	  empirical	  link	  from	  the	  level	  of	  
development,	  particularly	  as	  captured	  by	  the	  level	  of	  primary	  schooling,	  to	  
democracy.”45	  	  Yi	  Feng	  and	  Paul	  J.	  Zak	  virtually	  turn	  liberal	  economics	  and	  
democracy’s	  relationship	  into	  an	  axiom	  with	  their	  statement,	  “With	  sufficient	  
growth,	  nondemocratic	  governments	  almost	  always	  become	  democracies.”46	  	  The	  
key	  to	  these	  articles	  is	  in	  their	  mathematical	  analyses.	  	  These	  authors	  have	  
quantitatively	  proven	  that	  democracy	  and	  free	  markets	  go	  together,	  and	  that	  is	  what	  
is	  important	  for	  transitioning	  governments	  to	  understand.	  	  	  
From	  the	  early	  1990s	  until	  today,	  the	  debate	  has	  not	  been	  about	  what	  
different	  political	  and	  economic	  structures	  states	  can	  employ	  to	  satisfy	  their	  
citizens’	  needs.	  	  Rather,	  the	  discourse	  has	  been	  about	  how	  to	  best	  liberalize	  a	  
transitioning	  state.	  	  “Two	  major	  ideologies	  have	  been	  pitted	  against	  each	  other:	  the	  
‘Washington	  Consensus’	  and	  the	  ‘evolutionary-­‐institutionalist	  perspective.’47	  	  The	  
names	  suggest	  their	  relative	  meanings	  -­‐	  the	  former	  being	  a	  rapid	  overhauling	  of	  
multiple	  governmental	  structures,	  whereas	  the	  latter	  is	  a	  more	  gradual	  process.	  	  The	  
Washington	  Consensus	  employs	  the	  shock	  treatment	  by,	  “Conducting	  all	  necessary	  
reforms	  [which]	  at	  once	  gets	  the	  economy	  along	  an	  irreversible	  path	  featuring	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43	  Id,	  at	  9.	  
44	  Fabrice	  Murtin	  and	  Romain	  Wacziarg,	  The	  democratic	  Transition,	  19	  J.	  Econ.	  Growth	  141,	  142,	  	  
(2013).	  
45	  Id,	  at	  178.	  
46	  Yi	  Feng	  and	  Paul	  J.	  Zak,	  The	  Determinants	  of	  Democratic	  Transitions,	  43	  J.	  of	  Conf.	  Res.	  162,	  (1999).	  
47	  Peter	  Koveos,	  Economies	  in	  Transition:	  Recent	  Performance,	  30	  Syracuse	  J.	  of	  Intl.	  L.	  and	  Com.	  287,	  
291,	  (2003).	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strong	  market	  influence	  and	  weak	  government	  intervention.	  	  Once	  the	  old	  
structures	  disappear,	  new	  laws	  and	  mass	  privatization	  will	  enable	  the	  economy	  to	  
take	  full	  advantage	  of	  the	  new	  environment.”48	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  was	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  
shock	  treatment	  supporting	  the	  notion	  that,	  “Both	  extensive	  liberalization	  and	  
determined	  stabilization	  are	  needed	  for	  improved	  productivity	  and	  growth	  and	  that	  
sustaining	  these	  policies	  requires	  rapid	  structural	  changes	  as	  well	  as	  institutional	  
reform.”49	  	  However,	  not	  all	  states	  have	  undergone	  this	  same	  treatment.	  	  Certain	  
Asian	  countries,	  namely	  China,	  have	  undergone	  a	  much	  more	  incrementalist	  
approach	  to	  transition;	  this	  includes	  Myanmar.	  	  Regardless	  of	  the	  speed	  at	  which	  a	  
transition	  undergoes,	  the	  objective	  of	  the	  hegemonic-­‐influenced	  transition	  is	  the	  
same:	  “Countries	  will	  have	  completed	  their	  transition	  only	  when	  their	  problems	  and	  
further	  reforms	  come	  to	  resemble	  those	  of	  long-­‐established	  market	  economies	  at	  
similar	  levels	  of	  income.”50	  	  The	  idea	  is	  to	  assimilate	  the	  countries	  in	  question	  to	  the	  
globalized	  order	  with	  its	  neoliberal	  ideals	  of	  free	  world	  markets,	  privatization	  and	  
limited	  government	  involvement	  in	  the	  economy.	  
	  
B.	  The	  Liberal	  Critique	  of	  Myanmar	  
Since	  the	  1990s,	  Myanmar	  has	  made	  steady	  strides	  in	  liberalizing	  its	  politics	  and	  
economy.	  	  As	  previously	  demonstrated,	  the	  debate	  in	  Myanmar	  between	  liberalism	  
and	  socialism	  stretches	  back	  to	  the	  immediate	  aftermath	  of	  WWII.	  	  The	  country	  had	  
straddled	  both	  sides	  for	  many	  years	  leaning	  one	  way	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  and	  then	  
the	  other	  for	  another	  period	  of	  time.	  	  Since	  the	  1988	  uprisings	  however,	  the	  
National	  League	  for	  Democracy	  (NLD)	  has	  existed	  as	  something	  of	  a	  popular	  
underdog,	  steadily	  gaining	  support.	  	  Led	  by	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi,	  the	  party	  abstained	  
from	  the	  2010	  presidential	  elections.51	  	  By	  2012	  the	  party	  came	  back	  for	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48	  Id.	  
49	  Plan	  to	  Market,	  supra	  note	  40,	  at	  5.	  
50	  Id,	  at	  4.	  
51	  Suu	  Kyi’s	  NLD	  democracy	  party	  to	  rejoin	  Burma	  politics,	  BBC,	  (Nov	  18,	  2011)	  available	  at	  
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-­‐asia-­‐15787605	  (accessed	  Apr	  25,	  2015).	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country’s	  by-­‐elections	  and	  secured	  a	  sweeping	  victory	  in	  the	  country’s	  parliament.52	  	  
Clearly,	  the	  support	  is	  there	  for	  a	  liberal	  party,	  which	  can	  only	  make	  sense	  after	  so	  
many	  years	  of	  abuse	  under	  a	  socialist	  system.	  	  As	  its	  popularity	  grows	  within	  
Myanmar,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  analyze	  what	  the	  party’s	  ideologies	  are	  and	  what	  it	  
strives	  to	  accomplish.	  
The	  NLD	  supports	  the	  general	  liberal	  tenets	  of	  democracy,	  free	  markets,	  and	  
human	  rights.	  	  It	  is	  very	  understandable	  that	  the	  NLD	  believes	  in	  these	  institutions	  
to	  take	  Myanmar	  from	  its	  current	  and	  historical	  position	  of	  one	  of	  the	  world’s	  most	  
impoverished	  and	  damaged	  countries	  to	  one	  of	  fairness,	  equity	  and	  prosperity.	  	  
Liberalism	  makes	  the	  promise	  that	  citizens	  will	  have	  a	  say	  in	  their	  government,	  have	  
the	  opportunity	  to	  climb	  an	  economic	  ladder,	  and	  enjoy	  the	  rights	  that	  are	  inherent	  
to	  being	  a	  human.	  	  These	  ideals	  have	  registered	  with	  the	  Myanmarese	  people	  as	  
seen	  in	  the	  results	  of	  2012’s	  by-­‐elections	  in	  which	  a	  semi-­‐civilian	  government	  was	  
elected.	  	  The	  hope	  within	  the	  country	  is	  that	  the	  momentum	  for	  change	  persists.	  	  
The	  current	  transformation	  and	  the	  active	  pursuit	  for	  further	  change	  can	  be	  viewed	  
in	  the	  realms	  of	  law	  and	  democracy,	  free	  markets	  and	  human	  rights.	  
	  
1.	  Law	  and	  Democracy	  in	  Myanmar	  
Further	  democratization	  is	  of	  upmost	  concern.	  	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi	  could	  potentially	  
be	  eligible	  for	  the	  upcoming	  elections	  in	  late	  2015.53	  	  Her	  ineligibility	  is	  the	  reason	  
for	  the	  NLD	  not	  running	  in	  the	  2010	  elections.54	  	  Aung	  San	  herself	  has,	  “emphasized	  
how	  critical	  for	  Burma’s	  future	  it	  is	  both	  to	  change	  the	  retrograde	  document	  that	  is	  
the	  country’s	  current	  constitution,	  and	  to	  hold	  serious	  talks	  about	  the	  transition	  to	  
democracy.”55	  	  As	  Woollacott	  describes	  it,	  the	  military	  has	  put	  itself	  in	  the	  position	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52	  Kyaw	  Kyaw,	  Analysis	  of	  Myanmar’s	  NLD	  landslide,	  New	  Mandala	  (May,	  2012)	  available	  at	  
http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2012/05/01/analysis-­‐of-­‐myanmars-­‐nld-­‐landslide/	  (Apr	  
25,	  2015).	  
53	  Martin	  Woollacott,	  Why	  Burma	  still	  needs	  Aung	  San	  Suu	  Kyi,	  The	  Guardian	  (Apr,	  2015)	  available	  at	  
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/06/burma-­‐aung-­‐san-­‐suu-­‐kyi-­‐democracy-­‐
election	  (Apr	  25,	  2015).	  
54	  BBC,	  supra	  note	  51.	  
55	  Woollacott,	  supra	  note	  53.	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of	  a	  halfway	  house	  between	  military	  and	  civilian	  rule.56	  	  What	  Aung	  San	  and	  the	  NLD	  
must	  do	  is	  get	  the	  constitution	  repaired	  so	  that	  the	  military	  branch	  of	  the	  
government	  is	  not	  so	  strongly	  positioned.	  
In	  order	  to	  make	  these	  required	  repairs	  it	  is	  important	  that	  there	  actually	  be	  
people	  on	  the	  ground	  advocating	  for	  legal	  reform	  under	  the	  umbrella	  of	  liberalism.	  	  
Cheesman	  and	  Min	  San’s	  piece	  about	  cause	  lawyers	  in	  authoritarian	  regimes	  
supports	  this	  view.	  57	  	  In	  order	  for	  there	  to	  be	  cause	  lawyering	  there	  must	  first	  be	  
advocacy	  for	  law.	  	  They	  discuss	  three	  roles	  that	  law	  plays	  as	  being:	  guardianship	  of	  
justice,	  concern	  for	  professional	  ethics,	  and	  a	  transformative	  project	  for	  political	  and	  
economic	  change.	  What	  is	  important	  is	  that	  lawyers	  are	  strict	  adherents	  to	  the	  
justice	  of	  law	  to	  fight	  these	  authoritarian	  leaders	  on	  a	  political	  front.58	  	  Once	  these	  
values	  are	  embraced,	  institutions	  like	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  cause	  lawyers	  can	  
transplant	  liberal	  laws	  on	  a	  country	  like	  Myanmar.	  	  Then	  Myanmar	  and	  similar	  
states	  should	  be	  able	  to	  start	  enjoying	  the	  other	  pillars	  of	  the	  cosmopolitan	  world	  
such	  as	  democracy.	  	  It	  is	  this	  kind	  of	  cause	  lawyering	  the	  NLD	  benefits	  from	  in	  its	  
endeavors	  to	  repair	  the	  constitution	  and	  potentially	  instill	  a	  purer	  form	  of	  
democracy	  for	  Myanmar.	  
	  
2.	  Free	  Markets	  in	  Myanmar	  
As	  observed	  by	  the	  group	  Network	  Myanmar,	  there	  is	  a	  steady	  relationship	  building	  
between	  the	  Myanmar	  government,	  as	  more	  and	  more	  NLD	  members	  become	  
active,	  and	  neoliberal	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  IMF.59	  	  Both	  financial	  
institutions	  give	  regular	  investment	  assessments	  on	  the	  steadily	  liberalizing	  state.	  	  
This	  process	  actually	  began	  back	  in	  1987.	  	  Myanmar’s	  governmental	  body,	  the	  
SLORC,	  began	  a	  process	  of	  liberalizing	  a	  handful	  of	  its	  planned	  sectors.	  	  It	  was	  in	  
response	  to	  the	  drastic	  decline	  of	  the	  country’s	  economic	  performance	  of	  the	  1980s,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56	  Id.	  
57	  Nick	  Cheesman	  &	  Kyaw	  Min	  San,	  Not	  just	  Defending:	  Advocating	  for	  Law	  in	  Myanmar,	  31	  
WISCONSIN	  INT’L.	  L.	  J.	  702,	  702-­‐733	  (2014).	  
58	  Id.	  
59	  See	  The	  World	  Bank,	  Investment	  Climate	  Assessment	  in	  Myanmar,	  (Mar,	  2015)	  and	  IMF	  Press	  
Release,	  Statement	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  IMF	  Staff	  Visit	  to	  Myanmar,	  (Feb,	  2015)	  available	  at	  
http://www.networkmyanmar.org/index.php/economy	  (accessed	  Apr	  25,	  2015).	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which	  saw	  a	  steadily	  worsening	  GDP	  and	  budget	  deficit.	  	  With	  the	  encouragement	  of	  
the	  World	  Bank	  it	  began	  its	  slow,	  steady	  march	  towards	  liberalizing	  its	  economy.	  	  
The	  government	  opened	  both	  the	  agricultural	  and	  industrial	  sectors	  to	  privatization	  
and	  liberalization	  to	  domestic	  marketing.	  “With	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  Foreign	  
Investment	  Law	  in	  late	  1988,	  foreign	  investors	  in	  Myanmar	  [were]	  allowed	  to	  
establish	  wholly-­‐owned	  enterprises	  or	  enter	  into	  joint	  ventures	  with	  Myanma	  
citizens	  in	  almost	  all	  subsectors.”60	  	  However,	  it	  held	  on	  to	  11%	  of	  the	  total	  crop	  and	  
still	  operates	  the	  teak,	  gem,	  oil,	  power	  and	  gas	  industries.61	  	  	  	  
This	  liberal	  progress	  was	  stymied	  for	  a	  period	  of	  time	  during	  the	  nineties.	  	  
Myanmar’s	  government	  was	  the	  recipient	  of	  an	  extensive	  sanctions	  regime	  imposed	  
largely	  by	  the	  US	  and	  EU.	  	  In	  response	  to	  this,	  the	  regime	  halted	  its	  credit	  payments	  
to	  the	  IDA	  [International	  Development	  Association].	  	  This	  resulted	  in	  the	  
cancellation	  of	  approved	  current	  and	  future	  loans.62	  	  It	  was	  in	  response	  to	  the	  
horrendous	  quelling	  of	  political	  demonstrations	  against	  the	  regime.	  	  From	  1988	  to	  
1990	  thousands	  of	  protestors	  were	  jailed	  and	  many	  killed.63	  	  The	  West	  embarked	  on	  
a	  major	  sanctions	  regime	  against	  the	  Myanmar	  government.	  	  	  
This	  relationship	  between	  the	  Myanmar	  government	  and	  Western	  powers	  
has	  seen	  a	  very	  significant	  thawing	  since	  2010,	  and	  gains	  have	  been	  made.	  	  The	  
World	  Bank	  Reengagement	  and	  Reform	  Support	  Program	  states	  that	  the	  current	  
Myanmar	  government	  is	  implementing	  an	  extensive	  reform	  program	  that	  includes	  
floating	  the	  currency,	  new	  fiscal	  regulations,	  structural	  reforms	  designed	  to	  develop	  
the	  private	  sector,	  reviewing	  the	  financial	  sector	  in	  hopes	  of	  better	  access,	  and	  
creating	  a	  more	  conducive	  job	  environment.64	  
Many	  scholars	  and	  political	  talking	  heads	  regard	  this	  transformation	  with	  
considerable	  enthusiasm.	  	  There	  is	  much	  optimism	  for	  these	  opening	  markets	  due	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60	  World	  Bank,	  Myanmar:	  Policies	  for	  Sustaining	  Economic	  Reform,	  World	  Bank	  Country	  Economic	  
Report,	  8	  (1995).	  
61	  Id,	  at	  8.	  
62	  World	  Bank,	  Implementation	  Completion	  and	  Results	  Report	  on	  a	  Credit	  in	  the	  Amount	  of	  SDR	  SDR	  
287.75	  Million	  to	  the	  Republic	  of	  the	  Union	  of	  Myanmar	  for	  a	  Reengagement	  and	  Reform	  Support	  
Program,	  World	  Bank	  Document	  (2014).	  
63	  See	  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  148-­‐169.	  
64	  World	  Bank,	  supra	  note	  62,	  at	  1.	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Myanmar’s	  wealth	  in	  natural	  resources.65	  	  Organizations	  such	  as	  the	  OECD	  go	  so	  far	  
as	  to	  make	  recommendations	  on	  investment	  and	  other	  economic	  policies.66	  	  Since	  
their	  initial	  dealings	  with	  Myanmar	  in	  the	  early	  90s,	  the	  Bank	  has	  steadily	  
encouraged	  these	  neoliberal	  reforms.	  “An	  important	  lesson	  from	  other	  reforming	  
economies	  is	  that	  the	  main	  goal	  of	  privatization	  efforts	  should	  be	  to	  maximize	  
economic	  efficiency	  [.	  .	  .]	  The	  main	  reason	  to	  emphasize	  large-­‐scale	  privatization	  is	  
that	  there	  is	  growing	  evidence	  from	  market-­‐oriented	  and	  transition	  economies	  that	  
ownership	  matters	  for	  productivity.”67	  	  Until	  just	  recently,	  it	  had	  been	  since	  1987	  
when	  Myanmar	  last	  received	  any	  assistance	  from	  the	  IMF	  or	  the	  World	  Bank	  even	  
though	  it	  is	  a	  member	  of	  both	  institutions.68	  	  This	  changed	  in	  2013	  when	  the	  Asian	  
Development	  Bank	  and	  the	  World	  Bank	  agreed	  to	  give	  Myanmar	  a	  $900	  million	  
loan.69	  	  	  
	  
3.	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Myanmar	  
In	  recent	  history,	  the	  bulk	  of	  the	  international	  community’s	  concern	  towards	  
Myanmar	  has	  been	  in	  regards	  to	  its	  human	  rights	  record.	  	  There	  is	  no	  shortage	  of	  
examples	  of	  egregious	  crimes	  committed	  by	  the	  military	  leadership	  from	  forced	  
labor	  to	  ethnic	  cleansing.70	  	  Many	  find	  issue	  with	  international	  corporations	  doing	  
business	  in	  a	  country	  with	  such	  a	  record.	  	  Not	  only	  are	  these	  international	  
corporations	  not	  trying	  to	  alleviate	  the	  problems,	  they	  may	  be	  indirectly	  
exacerbating	  them.	  	  In	  2005	  the	  UN	  appointed	  a	  Special	  Representative	  of	  the	  UN	  
Secretary-­‐General	  to	  examine	  the	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  transnational	  
corporations	  and	  the	  role	  of	  states	  of	  regulating	  the	  businesses.	  	  	  The	  findings	  were	  
as	  follows,	  “while	  business	  operations	  can	  impact	  on	  virtually	  all	  internationally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65	  See	  BALBIR	  B.	  BHASIN,	  BUSINESS	  AND	  INVESTMENT	  OPPORTUNITIES	  IN	  EMERGING	  MYANMAR,	  
Bus.	  Expert	  Press	  1-­‐172	  (2014).	  
66	  See	  OECD,	  Investment	  Policy	  Reviews:	  Myanmar	  2014	  (2014).	  
67	  World	  Bank,	  supra	  note	  60,	  at	  19.	  
68	  Bhasin,	  supra	  note	  65,	  at	  13.	  
69Lending	  Agencies	  Restart	  Burma	  Loan	  Programs,	  Voice	  of	  America	  (January,	  2013)	  available	  at	  
http://www.voanews.com/content/lending-­‐agencies-­‐restart-­‐burma-­‐loan-­‐programs/1592573.html.	  
70	  See	  UN	  General	  Assembly,	  Situation	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  Myanmar,	  (2014),	  The	  Asian	  NGO	  Network	  
on	  National	  Human	  Rights	  Institutions	  (ANNI),	  2014	  ANNI	  Report	  on	  the	  Performance	  and	  
Establishment	  of	  National	  Human	  Rights	  Institutions	  in	  Asia,	  (2014).	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recognized	  human	  rights	  across	  the	  civil/political-­‐social/economic/cultural	  divide,	  
states	  need	  to	  mainstream	  human	  rights	  concerns	  into	  all	  business-­‐related	  legal	  and	  
policy	  domains,	  both	  internally	  and	  externally.”71	  	  The	  universal	  approach	  to	  this	  
problem	  centered	  on	  three	  pillars:	  states’	  duty	  to	  protect	  against	  human	  rights	  
abuses	  through	  enforcement	  and	  regulatory	  policies,	  corporations’	  responsibility	  to	  
not	  infringe	  on	  human	  rights,	  and	  more	  access	  for	  the	  victims	  of	  international	  
businesses’	  human	  rights	  abuses	  to	  legal	  and	  non-­‐legal	  entities.72	  
Human	  rights	  has	  become	  seen	  as	  an	  integral	  component	  of	  the	  liberal	  
transformation,	  and	  steps	  have	  been	  initiated	  to	  instill	  them	  as	  an	  institution	  within	  
Myanmar.	  	  Human	  rights	  is	  another	  part	  of	  the	  package	  of	  liberalism	  that	  works	  
alongside	  and	  assists	  the	  other	  tenets.	  	  “As	  a	  system	  of	  governance,	  however,	  
democracy	  is	  not	  only	  consistent	  with	  respect	  for	  human	  rights,	  but	  it	  also	  provides	  
opportunities	  for	  non-­‐governmental	  actors	  to	  pressure	  the	  government.”73	  	  NGOs,	  
international	  organizations,	  and	  local	  governments	  are	  able	  to	  communicate	  
together	  through	  the	  language	  of	  human	  rights.	  	  Transnational	  efforts	  have	  been	  
made	  in	  Myanmar	  to	  assist	  in	  instilling	  compliance	  to	  international	  human	  rights.	  
From	  2000	  to	  2003,	  Australia	  initiated	  a	  human	  rights	  training	  program	  for	  
government	  officials.74	  	  Its	  goal	  was	  to	  assist	  establishing	  an	  “independent	  Human	  
Rights	  Commission	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ‘Paris	  Principles.’”75	  	  	  The	  efforts	  made	  by	  
the	  Australian	  training	  program	  paid	  off,	  and	  in	  September	  2011,	  the	  “Myanmar	  
National	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  (‘Myanmar	  Commission’)	  was	  formally	  
established	  by	  Presidential	  Decree.”76	  	  The	  international	  community,	  Myanmarese	  
activists,	  and	  the	  transforming	  government	  hope	  that	  with	  a	  commission	  such	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71	  Daniel	  Augenstein,	  The	  Crisis	  of	  International	  Human	  Rights:	  Law	  in	  the	  Global	  Economy,	  44	  
NETHERLANDS	  YEARBOOK	  	  INT’L	  L.	  41,	  42	  (2014).	  
72	  Id.	  
73	  Emilie	  M.	  Hafner-­‐Burton	  and	  Edward	  D.	  Mansfield	  and	  Jon	  C.W.	  Pevehouse,	  Human	  Rights	  
Institiutions,	  Sovereignty	  Costs	  and	  Democratization,	  45	  BRI.	  J.	  POL.	  SCI.	  1,	  5	  (2015).	  
74	  David	  Kinley	  and	  Trevor	  Wilson,	  Engaging	  a	  Pariah:	  Human	  Rights	  Training	  in	  Burma/Myanmar,	  29	  
HMN.	  RTS.	  QUART.	  369	  (2007).	  
75	  Id	  at	  382,	  (the	  Paris	  Principles	  are	  a	  list	  of	  responsibilities	  for	  national	  institutions	  to	  adhere	  to	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  protection	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  Melissa	  Crouch,	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  Legal	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  and	  Rule	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  Law	  Reform:	  National	  Human	  Rights	  
Commission	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this	  in	  place,	  the	  changes	  that	  Myanmar	  so	  desperately	  needs	  will	  begin	  to	  take	  
shape,	  and	  Myanmar’s	  transition	  towards	  a	  liberal	  state	  will	  be	  firmly	  grounded	  in	  
international	  law	  and	  human	  rights.	  
Myanmar’s	  transformation	  is	  a	  real	  process.	  	  There	  have	  been	  major	  strides	  
made	  by	  the	  liberal	  movement	  both	  from	  within	  and	  outside	  the	  country.	  	  There	  is	  
certainly	  a	  large	  amount	  of	  optimism	  surrounding	  these	  changes,	  with	  some	  well-­‐
warranted	  skepticism.	  	  But	  what	  I	  wish	  to	  ascertain	  is	  whether	  this	  transition	  and	  
these	  changes	  are	  really	  from	  any	  true	  agency	  of	  Myanmar	  and	  its	  people	  at	  all.	  	  Is	  
Myanmar	  really	  in	  control	  of	  its	  transition	  or	  is	  there	  more	  at	  work	  systemically?	  	  
How	  much	  agency	  does	  a	  State	  such	  as	  Myanmar	  have	  in	  a	  time	  of	  transition?	  The	  
next	  chapter	  offers	  another	  perspective	  on	  these	  questions	  from	  a	  group	  of	  scholars	  
much	  less	  optimistic	  than	  their	  liberal	  peers,	  authors	  of	  international	  banking	  
institutions	  or	  politicians.	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IV.	  The	  False	  Contingency	  of	  the	  Liberal	  Transition	  on	  
Poor	  States	  
	  
I	  posit	  that	  Myanmar’s	  political/economic	  transition	  is	  not	  out	  of	  its	  own	  true	  
agency.	  	  The	  state	  and	  its	  people	  are	  positioned	  in	  a	  space	  whereby	  the	  external	  
pressures	  on	  them	  exerted	  by	  exterior	  international	  institutions	  strongly	  limit	  and	  
influence	  the	  actual	  choices	  they	  are	  able	  to	  make.	  	  These	  external	  forces	  have	  
influenced	  the	  history	  of	  Myanmar	  for	  a	  long	  time	  and	  have	  limited	  the	  breadth	  of	  
options	  open	  to	  them	  during	  the	  process	  of	  transition.	  	  The	  liberal	  movement	  that	  
has	  been	  striving	  for	  change	  since	  the	  late	  1980s	  is	  actually	  unaware	  of	  how	  much	  
Myanmar’s	  agency	  has	  been	  curtailed	  by	  these	  forces.	  	  To	  understand	  the	  limits	  and	  
pressures	  I	  am	  speaking	  of,	  I	  will	  employ	  Susan	  Marks	  and	  Roberto	  Unger’s	  concepts	  
of	  ‘False	  Contingency’	  and	  ‘False	  Necessity.’	  	  I	  believe	  these	  theories	  permeate	  
Myanmar’s	  ‘Narrative	  of	  Progress’	  as	  articulated	  by	  Thomas	  Skouteris.	  	  These	  
theories	  come	  together	  to	  give	  a	  comprehensive	  picture	  of	  the	  other	  side	  of	  
Myanmar’s	  transition,	  away	  from	  naïve	  optimism	  in	  a	  liberal	  overhauling.	  	  
Narratives	  of	  progress	  drive	  ideologies	  of	  false	  necessity	  that	  liberal	  systems	  are	  
necessary	  because	  they	  are	  the	  best	  systems	  available.	  	  These	  two	  forces	  
demonstrate	  the	  current	  power	  that	  neoliberalism	  has	  over	  transition.	  	  Liberalism,	  
hijacked	  by	  the	  ideologies	  of	  neoliberalism,	  has	  created	  a	  space	  in	  which	  the	  
contingencies	  in	  front	  of	  Myanmar	  are	  actually	  false.	  	  	  
	   This	  chapter,	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  the	  different	  forces	  that	  are	  in	  action	  around	  
the	  globe	  that	  limit	  and	  pressure	  the	  transition	  of	  a	  state	  such	  as	  Myanmar.	  	  I	  will	  
first	  explore	  the	  theories	  of	  false	  necessity,	  narratives	  of	  progress	  and	  false	  
contingency.	  	  I	  will	  then	  demonstrate	  how	  neoliberalism	  has	  taken	  three	  major	  
pillars	  of	  liberalism:	  rule	  of	  law,	  democracy,	  and	  capitalism,	  and	  turned	  them	  into	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A.	  False	  Necessity	  and	  False	  Contingency	  
False	  necessity	  and	  false	  contingency	  are	  two	  different	  sides	  of	  the	  same	  coin.	  	  
Unger	  and	  Marks	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  beliefs	  societies	  have	  in	  their	  ideologies	  
and	  politics.	  	  Unger	  asserts	  that	  the	  headstrong	  pursuit	  towards	  a	  universal	  
cosmopolitan	  creates	  ideological/political	  necessities	  that	  are	  false.	  	  Marks,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  argues	  that	  this	  universal	  pursuit,	  in	  turn,	  results	  in	  a	  narrowing	  of	  the	  
scope	  of	  the	  contingencies	  Unger	  is	  arguing	  are	  available.	  	  Both	  themes	  will	  be	  
explored	  further	  below.	  
	  
1.	  False	  Necessity	  and	  its	  Narratives	  of	  Progress	  
A	  transition’s	  freedoms	  and	  constraints	  are	  greatly	  influenced	  by	  the	  degree	  of	  
freedom	  of	  agency	  in	  the	  process	  of	  transition.	  	  Roberto	  Unger	  espouses	  the	  idea	  of	  
freedom	  of	  agency	  in	  his	  book	  False	  Necessity.	  	  False	  necessity	  is	  the	  notion	  that	  the	  
current	  state	  of	  things	  and	  the	  context	  in	  which	  we	  live	  and	  make	  decisions	  in	  is	  
how	  it	  ought	  to	  be.	  	  It	  is	  the	  natural	  and	  necessary	  state	  of	  being.	  	  For	  Unger,	  this	  is	  
false.77	  	  Unger	  means	  that	  social	  aspects	  such	  as	  systems	  of	  governance	  and	  thought	  
are	  not	  fixed	  but	  are	  mutable:	  “What	  seems	  to	  be	  given	  and	  presupposed	  is	  merely	  
what	  we	  have	  temporarily	  refrained	  from	  challenging	  and	  remaking.”78	  Like	  Karin	  
van	  Marle’s	  ideas	  of	  transformation,	  there	  should	  be	  no	  limits	  on	  an	  individual	  or	  
institution’s	  imagination	  to	  create	  what	  it	  desires.	  	  	  The	  idea	  that	  there	  is	  one	  natural	  
or	  correct	  way	  to	  do	  so	  is	  false.	  
This	  paper	  posits	  that	  Unger’s	  concept	  of	  false	  necessity	  has	  greatly	  shaped	  
current	  liberal	  ideologies.	  	  Democracy,	  capitalism	  and	  human	  rights	  all	  bolstered	  by	  
rule	  of	  law	  have	  become	  a	  false	  necessity.	  	  Thomas	  Skouteris	  demonstrates	  how	  a	  
grand	  narrative	  of	  progress	  is	  used	  to	  instill	  this	  feeling	  of	  necessity	  and	  the	  
necessity	  of	  liberal	  institutions	  such	  as	  democracy:	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
77	  See	  ROBERTO	  UNGER,	  FALSE	  NECESSITY,	  (Verso,	  2nd	  edn.	  London,	  2004).	  
78	  Susan	  Marks,	  False	  Contingency,	  Susan	  Marks,	  CUR.	  L.	  PROB.	  3	  (2009)	  quoting	  id.	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Instead	  of	  being	  described	  as	  historically	  and	  culturally	  specific	  
ideological	  projects,	  they	  [the	  concepts	  of	  democracy	  and	  absolutism]	  
are	  dehistoricized	  and	  de-­‐politicized:	  they	  appear	  as	  forces	  of	  nature	  
which	  somehow	  simply	  exist,	  as	  traits	  of	  humanity,	  like	  the	  
propensities	  to	  drink,	  to	  eat,	  to	  maximize	  our	  individual	  interest,	  and	  
so	  on.	  	  Scholars	  of	  ideology	  critique	  have	  identified	  this	  discursive	  
strategy	  as	  ‘naturalization’,	  “whereby	  existing	  social	  arrangements	  
come	  to	  seem	  as	  obvious	  and	  self-­‐evident,	  as	  if	  they	  were	  natural	  
phenomena	  belonging	  to	  a	  world	  ‘out	  there.’79	  
	  
States	  and	  even	  broader	  institutions	  like	  international	  organizations	  embrace	  this	  
singular	  view	  of	  the	  road	  to	  prosperity	  because	  the	  narrative	  joining	  freedom	  
(democracy)	  with	  free	  markets	  overrides	  reality	  and	  even	  other	  narratives.	  	  Being	  
part	  of	  the	  larger	  narrative	  of	  progress	  is	  the	  glue	  that	  holds	  the	  narrative	  of	  
democracy	  and	  free	  markets	  together.	  	  	  
Skouteris	  writes	  about	  the	  narrative	  of	  progress	  through	  law	  that	  keeps	  this	  
cycle	  moving.80	  	  He	  analyses	  the	  role	  of	  narratives,	  specifically	  of	  progress,	  in	  the	  
field	  of	  law	  development.	  “The	  basic	  contention	  is	  that	  although	  progress	  may	  be	  a	  
convenient	  label	  to	  caption	  a	  certain	  international	  law	  event,	  it	  is	  ultimately	  a	  notion	  
devoid	  of	  meaning	  unless	  placed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  narrative	  –	  a	  story	  about	  how	  
things	  were,	  how	  things	  are,	  and	  how	  things	  need	  to	  be.”81	  	  He	  describes	  how	  these	  
narratives	  cannot	  “speak	  for	  themselves,”	  but	  they	  are	  instead	  constructed	  by	  an	  
author	  that	  uses	  vocabulary	  and	  language	  as	  his/her	  tool.	  	  The	  author	  constructs	  
these	  narratives	  through	  tools	  such	  as	  “assumptions,	  images,	  metaphors,	  and	  other	  
discursive	  structures.”82	  	  It	  is	  what	  these	  narratives	  do	  after	  their	  author	  has	  
constructed	  them	  that	  demonstrates	  their	  power.	  	  They	  are	  able	  to	  remove	  
competitive	  accounts	  of	  the	  reality	  of	  a	  situation	  and	  replace	  them	  with	  a	  simplified	  
version	  that	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  objective.	  	  They	  “exclude	  alternative	  accounts	  of	  
progress.”83	  	  Then,	  these	  narratives	  of	  progress	  begin	  to	  “constitute	  the	  basis	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79	  THOMAS	  SKOUTERIS,	  THE	  NOTION	  OF	  PROGRESS	  IN	  INTERNATIONAL	  LAW	  DISCOURSE,	  Thomas	  
Skouteris	  Ph.D.	  Thesis	  46	  (2008)	  (quoting	  Susan	  Marks,	  International	  Law,	  Democracy,	  and	  the	  End	  of	  
History,	  22)	  
80	  Id,	  1-­‐184.	  
81	  Id,	  at	  1.	  
82	  Id.	  
83	  Id.	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policies	  and	  decisions	  that	  produce	  tangible	  effects	  on	  everyday	  life.	  	  In	  this	  light,	  
progress	  narratives	  are	  no	  longer	  descriptions	  of	  an	  objective	  reality	  but	  powerful	  
rhetorical	  strategies	  of	  (de)legitimation.84	  	  	  
Skouteris’s	  narratives	  of	  progress	  are	  the	  driving	  force	  behind	  Unger’s	  false	  
necessities.	  	  False	  necessities	  are	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  of	  what	  “things	  were,	  how	  things	  
are,	  and	  how	  things	  need	  to	  be.”85	  	  Narratives	  of	  progress	  create	  the	  necessity	  of	  
believing	  that	  democracy,	  rule	  of	  law,	  and	  capitalism	  are	  how	  things	  were,	  are	  and	  
need	  to	  be.	  	  These	  systems	  are	  the	  most	  dominant	  because	  they	  are	  naturally	  the	  
best.	  	  Unger	  writes,	  “[their]	  advocates	  regularly	  subscribe	  to	  the	  convergence	  thesis:	  
the	  belief	  that	  contemporary	  societies	  gradually	  converge	  on	  a	  connected	  set	  of	  the	  
best	  available	  practices	  and	  institutions	  worldwide.”86	  	  Skouteris	  demonstrates	  that	  
as	  these	  terms	  such	  as	  democracy	  or	  rule	  of	  law	  have	  become	  normalized,	  the	  need	  
to	  fully	  grasp	  their	  meanings	  is	  gone	  and	  the	  discussion	  jumps	  forward	  with	  the	  
assumptions	  of	  their	  meanings.	  	  “If	  my	  political	  agenda	  is	  derived	  from	  the	  concept	  
of	  democracy,	  and	  if	  democracy	  stands	  on	  the	  side	  of	  progress,	  then	  my	  agenda	  is	  
progressive.”87	  	  Rittich	  demonstrates	  that	  often	  it	  is	  not	  even	  a	  matter	  of	  “best	  
available	  practices:”	  “Rather	  than	  a	  product	  of	  Darwinian	  superiority,	  rules	  and	  
practices	  become	  dominant	  under	  a	  variety	  of	  pressures	  and	  circumstances.	  	  They	  
are	  often	  the	  result	  of	  political	  struggles.	  	  Alternatively,	  dominant	  institutional	  forms	  
and	  practices	  may	  be	  the	  consequence	  of	  various	  hegemonies,	  national,	  
professional,	  ideological	  and	  disciplinary.”88	  	  In	  both	  scenarios	  it	  is	  the	  power	  
dynamic	  of	  allowing	  the	  winners’	  story	  to	  trump	  opposing	  ideologies,	  narratives,	  
systems,	  or	  disciplines	  that	  determines	  the	  direction	  history	  takes.	  	  Like	  Skouteris	  
states,	  “it	  would	  be	  enough	  for	  me	  to	  claim	  or	  prove	  that	  I	  contribute	  to	  democracy	  
in	  order	  to	  gain	  legitimacy,	  without	  really	  having	  to	  enter	  into	  investigations	  of	  the	  
notion	  of	  democracy.”89	  	  Narratives	  limit	  the	  “available	  practices	  and	  institutions.”	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84	  Id.	  
85	  Id.	  
86	  DAVID	  HARVEY,	  A	  BRIEF	  HISTORY	  OF	  NEOLIBERALISM,	  54	  (Ox.	  Uni.	  Pr.,	  2005).	  
87	  Skouteris,	  supra	  note	  79,	  at	  47.	  
88	  KERRY	  RITTICH,	  RECHARACTERIZING	  RESTRUCTURING:	  LAW,	  DISTRIBUTION	  AND	  GENDER	  IN	  
MARKET	  REFORM,	  93	  (Kluwer	  L.	  Int’l.,	  2002).	  
89	  Skouteris,	  supra	  note	  79,	  at	  47.	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They	  create	  the	  false	  necessities	  that	  nation	  states	  embrace	  and	  then	  promote.	  	  They	  
can	  be	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  control	  by	  one	  state	  over	  another.	  	  They	  can	  also	  be	  used	  as	  
a	  tool	  for	  control	  by	  a	  state	  against	  its	  own	  people.	  	  	  
	  
2.	  False	  Contingency	  
The	  other	  side	  of	  the	  same	  coin	  is	  a	  concept	  whose	  effects	  are	  responsible	  for	  the	  
true	  insidiousness	  of	  this	  narrative	  of	  false	  necessity:	  False	  Contingency	  by	  Susan	  
Marks’s.	  	  It	  is	  her	  interpretation	  of	  the	  question	  of	  agency,	  and	  it	  lends	  itself	  to	  the	  
goal	  of	  this	  particular	  project.	  	  In	  her	  article	  she	  uses	  Marx’s	  The	  Eighteenth	  
Brumaire	  of	  Louis	  Bonaparte	  to	  question	  how	  “[men]	  make	  their	  own	  history.”90	  	  She	  
writes,	  “men	  make	  their	  own	  history	  [.	  .	  .]	  but	  [.	  .	  .]	  they	  do	  not	  make	  it	  just	  as	  they	  
please	  in	  circumstances	  of	  their	  own	  choosing	  but	  rather	  in	  circumstances	  they	  
inherit.”91	  	  It	  is	  not	  determinism;	  the	  future	  is	  not	  set	  in	  stone.	  	  But,	  it	  is	  an	  
acknowledgment	  that	  there	  is	  more	  to	  the	  decisions	  people,	  groups,	  and	  
governments	  make	  than	  what	  a	  notion	  of	  free	  will	  would	  have	  us	  believe.	  	  
There	  is	  a	  constant	  battle	  taking	  place	  over	  determinism	  and	  free	  will.	  	  Marks	  
engages	  this	  debate	  with	  Isaiah	  Berlin	  and	  EH	  Carr.	  	  She	  posits	  that	  actions	  can	  and	  
do	  have	  unintended	  consequences;	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  they	  are	  the	  outcome	  of	  
“some	  all	  powerful	  force,	  but	  it	  is	  to	  note	  that	  social	  circumstances	  matter	  in	  
historical	  explanation.”92	  	  Marks	  compares	  the	  forms	  of	  the	  word	  determinism.	  	  
Determination	  –	  the	  process	  –	  and	  the	  verb	  to	  determine	  –	  the	  action	  –	  makes	  
determinism	  –	  the	  belief.93	  	  She	  explains	  that	  determinism	  has	  multiple	  meanings	  
which	  include	  words	  such	  as	  compulsion,	  cause	  and	  effect,	  and	  even	  fated.	  	  This	  idea	  
of	  strict	  inevitability	  cannot	  be	  what	  Marks	  means	  because	  she	  acknowledges	  
herself	  that,	  “history	  is	  a	  social	  product,	  not	  given	  but	  made.”94	  	  But	  what	  about	  the	  
verb	  ‘to	  determine?’	  	  ‘To	  determine’	  means	  ‘to	  set	  bounds.’95	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	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determination	  is	  the	  process	  of	  setting	  bounds	  or	  conditioning	  outcomes.	  	  
Determination	  sets	  limits	  and	  pressures,	  which	  are	  quite	  different	  from	  
determinism’s	  reliance	  on	  concepts	  such	  as	  accident	  and	  arbitrary	  factors.96	  	  	  
	   Marks	  examines	  how	  history	  comes	  to	  be	  made.	  	  She	  embraces	  neither	  
necessity	  nor	  contingency.	  	  Events	  are	  not	  inevitable,	  but	  they	  are	  not	  accidental	  
either:	  “Rather,	  there	  exist	  some	  ‘necessary	  factors’,	  as	  Williams	  calls	  them,	  in	  the	  
shape	  of	  limits	  and	  pressures	  which	  orient	  change	  without	  actually	  predetermining	  
it.”97	  	  Her	  point	  is	  that	  we	  need	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  not	  only	  the	  false	  necessity,	  that	  
things	  are	  not	  the	  way	  they	  are	  because	  they	  are	  natural	  and	  therefore	  immutable,	  
but	  we	  must	  also	  be	  cognizant	  of	  false	  contingency,	  that	  things	  are	  the	  way	  they	  are	  
because	  there	  are	  forces	  at	  work	  that	  set	  bounds	  and	  limit	  a	  possible	  outcome.	  
	   False	  contingency	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  history	  not	  being	  just	  a	  “matter	  of	  chance	  
and	  will.”98	  	  “Insofar	  as	  anti-­‐necessitarian	  critique	  depends	  on	  showing	  that	  current	  
arrangements	  are	  not	  simply	  arbitrary	  or	  accidental,	  but	  belong	  with	  the	  logics	  of	  a	  
system	  which	  must	  also	  be	  brought	  within	  the	  analytical	  frame.”99	  	  To	  further	  grasp	  
what	  she	  is	  arguing	  she	  puts	  forth	  a	  few	  examples,	  one	  of	  which	  I	  will	  attempt	  to	  
expand.	  	  Marks	  discusses	  David	  Kennedy’s	  The	  International	  Human	  Rights	  
Movement:	  Part	  of	  the	  Problem?	  in	  which	  he	  argues	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  a	  problem	  
when	  viewed	  pragmatically.	  	  He	  is	  fighting	  against	  the	  false	  necessity	  that	  human	  
rights	  are	  part	  of	  a	  universal	  interest.	  	  There	  is	  not	  a	  universal	  interest	  because	  
different	  people	  will	  view	  costs	  and	  benefits	  differently.100	  	  	  
But	  the	  problem	  with	  rational	  choice	  is	  not	  just	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  register	  
that	  costs	  and	  benefits	  will	  look	  different	  and	  be	  evaluated	  differently	  
by	  different	  people.	  	  It	  is	  also	  that	  it	  fails	  to	  register	  that	  costs	  and	  
benefits	  are	  linked,	  both	  to	  one	  another	  and	  to	  a	  larger	  set	  of	  systemic	  
processes,	  the	  upshot	  of	  which	  is	  that	  some	  people	  always	  enjoy	  social	  
benefits	  while	  bearing	  very	  few	  social	  costs,	  and	  the	  reverse	  applies	  to	  
others.101	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96	  Id,	  at	  8.	  
97	  Id,	  at	  9.	  
98	  Id,	  at	  10.	  
99	  Id.	  
100	  Id,	  at	  13.	  
101	  Id,	  at	  14.	  
	   28	  
Marks	  explains	  that	  necessity	  gets	  misconstrued	  as	  contingency.102	  	  Ideas	  and	  
ideologies	  such	  as	  liberalism,	  democracy,	  or	  human	  rights	  are	  creators	  or	  enablers	  
of	  contingency.	  	  Unger	  argues	  that	  they	  are	  falsely	  necessary	  because	  there	  are,	  of	  
course,	  other	  options	  and	  contingencies	  that	  society	  and	  humans	  can	  follow.	  	  Marks	  
argues	  they	  are	  falsely	  contingent	  because	  they	  do	  not	  actually	  give	  the	  
contingencies	  that	  they	  are	  supposed	  to	  be	  offering.	  	  False	  necessity	  does	  not	  
account	  for	  the	  pressures	  and	  limits	  that	  coexist	  with	  it	  at	  all	  times.	  	  False	  necessity	  
and	  false	  contingency	  inhabit	  the	  same	  space.	  	  Or	  as	  Marks	  explains,	  “False	  
contingency	  [.	  .	  .]	  is	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  an	  absent	  presence.”103	  	  It	  is	  the	  other	  side	  of	  the	  
same	  coin	  of	  false	  necessity.	  
	  
B.	  The	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  Democracy,	  and	  Free	  Markets	  
This	  paper	  makes	  the	  argument	  that	  Myanmar’s	  lack	  of	  agency	  in	  its	  transition	  is	  
due	  to	  the	  concepts	  of	  false	  necessity	  and	  false	  contingency.	  	  The	  pillars	  of	  liberalism	  
are	  the	  false	  necessities	  that	  are	  imposed	  upon	  Myanmar.	  	  I	  posit	  that	  the	  problem	  is	  
not	  necessarily	  the	  liberal	  system,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  neoliberal	  hijacking	  of	  liberalism	  that	  
presents	  false	  contingencies	  in	  Myanmar’s	  transition.	  	  This	  section	  will	  explore	  
neoliberalism	  and	  its	  ideologies.	  
	  
1.	  The	  Neoliberal	  Package	  
Neoliberalism	  and	  globalization	  have	  shown	  themselves	  to	  be	  major	  perpetrators	  of	  
the	  theme	  of	  false	  necessity	  and	  its	  supporting	  narratives	  and	  false	  contingency.	  	  
Unger	  offers	  three	  assumptions	  that	  result	  in	  necessitarian	  thinking	  that	  apply	  to	  
Myanmar’s	  case:	  the	  closed	  list	  idea,	  the	  indivisibility	  idea,	  and	  the	  determinist	  idea.	  	  
The	  closed	  list	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  there	  are	  only	  certain	  institutions	  and	  systems	  to	  
choose	  from	  such	  as	  feudalism,	  capitalism,	  or	  Marxism.	  	  The	  indivisibility	  idea	  is	  that	  
there	  is	  no	  common	  ground	  these	  different	  systems	  can	  share;	  they	  are	  exclusive	  of	  
each	  other.	  	  And,	  the	  determinist	  idea	  is	  that	  “lawlike	  forces	  determine	  their	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[system’s]	  evolution.”104	  	  These	  law-­‐like	  forces	  are	  essentially	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  
forces	  that	  the	  quantitative	  analyses	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  use	  to	  
demonstrate	  their	  point.	  	  These	  forces	  can	  also	  be	  described	  as	  correlations,	  but	  by	  
utilizing	  mathematical	  formulas	  these	  correlations	  become	  corollaries,	  which	  
determine	  a	  system’s	  evolution	  and	  make	  it	  “lawlike.”	  
Neoliberalism	  utilizes	  all	  three	  of	  Unger’s	  list	  of	  necessitarian	  thinking.	  	  The	  
closed	  list	  idea	  has	  been	  narrowed	  to	  essentially	  one	  option,	  liberalism,	  since	  the	  
end	  of	  history.	  	  There	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  there	  is	  a	  fixed	  relationship	  between	  political	  
and	  economic	  systems	  that	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  break.	  	  Essentially,	  only	  liberal	  markets	  
are	  going	  to	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  the	  freedom	  necessary	  for	  democracy.105	  	  The	  
thinking	  is	  that,	  “there	  ought	  to	  be	  a	  particular	  division	  of	  labor	  and	  costs	  among	  
enterprises,	  the	  state,	  civil	  society	  and	  individuals	  or	  households,”106	  has	  become	  
axiomatic.	  	  These	  ideas	  are	  the	  false	  necessity.	  	  	  Unger	  writes,	  “They	  teach	  that	  the	  
institutional	  arrangements	  of	  contemporary	  society	  are	  the	  outcomes	  of	  many	  
loosely	  connected	  sequences	  of	  social	  and	  ideological	  conflict	  rather	  than	  of	  
irresistible	  and	  determinate	  functional	  imperatives,	  driving	  forward	  a	  succession	  of	  
indivisible	  institutional	  systems.”107	  
The	  necessity	  of	  a	  closed	  list	  is	  compounded	  by	  the	  indivisibility	  
neoliberalism	  enforces	  through	  its	  various	  methods	  including,	  to	  a	  great	  extent,	  law.	  
Unger	  continues,	  “The	  second	  tenet	  of	  neoliberalism	  is	  the	  renunciation	  by	  the	  state	  
of	  any	  affirmative	  strategy	  of	  national	  development	  other	  than	  the	  strategy	  implicit	  
in	  an	  unresisting	  adherence	  to	  the	  world	  economic	  order.”108	  	  Law	  plays	  a	  pivotal	  
role	  in	  the	  neoliberal	  transitions	  because	  it	  provides	  the	  structure	  and	  boundaries	  to	  
the	  reforms	  by	  deliberating	  the	  boundaries	  between	  the	  market	  and	  the	  state.	  	  It	  
also	  forms	  the	  border	  between	  politics	  and	  economics.	  	  	  	  This	  is	  relevant	  in	  a	  
neoliberal	  transition	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that,	  “The	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  
rights	  are	  positioned	  on	  the	  side	  of	  economics	  and	  efficiency,	  while	  many	  forms	  of	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  Unger,	  supra	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regulation	  are	  characterized	  as	  political.”109	  	  Rittich	  demonstrates	  how	  “The	  state’s	  
role	  in	  promoting	  growth	  has	  been	  conclusively	  trumped	  by	  that	  of	  the	  market.”110	  	  
The	  reason	  why	  the	  state’s	  role	  in	  promoting	  economic	  growth	  has	  been	  
taken	  away	  is	  because	  it	  was	  determined	  to	  be	  less	  efficient	  as	  other,	  perhaps	  more	  
law-­‐like	  forces	  bolstered	  by	  a	  narrative	  of	  progress.	  	  Rittich	  describes	  the	  rhetoric	  of	  
“best	  practices”	  as	  being	  what	  we	  might	  consider	  Unger’s	  determinist	  (law-­‐like	  
forces)	  idea.	  	  The	  meaning	  of	  “best	  practices”	  being	  that,	  the	  particular	  policies	  of	  
deregulation	  or	  privatization	  are	  in	  practice	  because	  they	  have	  proven	  themselves	  
to	  be	  reliable	  and	  established.	  	  They	  are	  better	  than	  the	  other	  alternatives	  available	  
and	  are	  the	  “recipe	  for	  success.”111	  	  The	  notion	  that	  other	  ideas	  that	  still	  include	  the	  
state	  in	  promoting	  growth	  is	  forgotten.	  	  “The	  genius	  of	  best	  practice	  arguments	  is	  
that,	  through	  the	  suppression	  of	  alternative	  practices	  and	  amnesia	  about	  the	  history	  
of	  existing	  practices,	  local	  successes	  and	  particular	  interests	  are	  construed	  as	  the	  
general	  interest	  and	  the	  inevitable	  outcome	  of	  the	  process	  of	  market	  evolution.”112	  	  
The	  belief	  in	  science	  and	  its	  overhaul	  of	  thought	  has	  created	  a	  sense	  of	  natural	  law	  
to	  other	  contexts	  and	  suppressed	  alternative	  practices.	  	  	  
	  Economics	  is	  assumed	  to	  act	  according	  to	  natural	  laws.	  	  These	  laws	  are	  
recognizable	  and	  capable	  of	  being	  manipulated.	  	  Neoliberalism	  is	  the	  faith	  that	  
economics	  work	  like	  the	  natural	  world	  and	  follow	  a	  set	  of	  natural	  laws	  that	  should	  
not	  be	  tampered	  with.	  	  If	  tampered	  with,	  these	  laws	  are	  disrupted	  and	  disorder	  
ensues.	  	  This	  is	  a	  false	  equivalency.	  	  There	  is	  no	  reason	  for	  economics	  to	  follow	  a	  
natural	  set	  of	  rules	  like	  chemistry.	  	  Economics,	  after	  all,	  is	  influenced	  by	  humans’	  
irrationality,	  emotions,	  and	  culture,	  none	  of	  which	  is	  quantifiable.	  	  However,	  “Best	  
practices	  both	  emerge	  from	  and	  serve	  this	  functionalist	  approach	  to	  economic	  
development,	  insofar	  as	  such	  arguments	  suggest	  that	  the	  optimal	  institutions	  can	  be	  
empirically	  and	  scientifically	  derived	  through	  observation	  and	  analysis	  of	  markets	  
and	  economic	  structures	  on	  a	  comparative	  basis,”113	  just	  like	  the	  quantitative	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studies	  listed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  regarding	  democratizing	  states.	  	  These	  
quantitative	  studies	  provide	  shoddy	  evidence	  in	  a	  field	  that	  is	  unquantifiable.	  	  
Empirical	  evidence	  is	  being	  used	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  narratives	  of	  progress.	  	  “Influential	  
doctrines,	  expounded	  as	  scientific	  insight	  in	  the	  universities	  of	  the	  leading	  powers,	  
lend	  them	  a	  semblance	  of	  naturalness	  and	  necessity.”114	  The	  belief	  in	  the	  
naturalness	  of	  markets	  and	  their	  “optimal	  form”	  gives	  hegemonic	  states	  and	  
institutions	  the	  ammunition	  they	  need	  to	  push	  through	  policies	  that	  are	  neoliberal	  
in	  nature.	  	  But	  as	  Unger	  states,	  “Nevertheless,	  they	  remain,	  in	  the	  end,	  neither	  
natural	  nor	  necessary.”115	  
What	  is	  of	  concern	  is	  how	  powerful	  the	  proponents	  of	  these	  systems,	  
ideologies	  and	  institutions	  actually	  are.	  	  The	  hegemony	  of	  the	  West	  and	  its	  
international	  organizations	  and	  businesses	  perpetuate	  these	  false	  necessities	  
through	  progress	  narratives.	  	  Narratives	  are	  powerful	  tools	  for	  deciding	  public	  
perception:	  
A	  major	  effect	  of	  the	  success	  of	  the	  progress-­‐through-­‐globalization	  
narrative	  is	  that	  those	  who	  jump	  on	  the	  bandwagon	  to	  facilitate	  the	  
process	  of	  economic	  integration	  come	  to	  seem	  reasonable	  and	  
pragmatic,	  while	  those	  who	  either	  resist	  or	  pose	  alternative	  
interpretations	  of	  events	  seem	  alternatively	  hopelessly	  idealistic	  and	  
old-­‐fashioned	  or	  simply	  wrong.116	  
	  
Harvey	  demonstrates	  how	  neoliberalism	  has	  been	  used,	  and	  serves,	  in	  fact,	  as	  its	  
own	  narrative.117	  	  He	  asserts	  that	  the	  conceptual	  apparatus	  that	  was	  advanced	  in	  
order	  for	  neoliberalism	  to	  be	  embraced	  was	  that	  it	  espoused	  ideals	  of	  human	  dignity	  
and	  individual	  freedom.118	  It	  depends	  on	  the	  simple	  notion	  that	  its	  policies	  are	  
simply	  common	  sense.	  	  For	  example	  he	  points	  out	  Margaret	  Thatcher’s	  “no	  
alternative”	  rhetoric:119	  “Common	  sense	  is	  constructed	  out	  of	  longstanding	  practices	  
of	  cultural	  socialization	  often	  rooted	  deep	  in	  regional	  or	  national	  traditions.”	  	  He	  
continues,	  “The	  word	  ‘freedom’	  resonates	  so	  widely	  within	  the	  common-­‐sense	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understanding	  of	  Americans	  that	  it	  becomes	  ‘a	  button	  that	  elites	  can	  press	  to	  open	  
the	  door	  to	  the	  masses’	  to	  justify	  almost	  anything.”120	  	  By	  propagating	  this	  belief	  in	  
pragmatism	  and	  efficiency	  while	  simultaneously	  abhorring	  any	  move	  towards	  an	  
alternative,	  the	  dynamic	  resolves	  into	  one	  of	  false	  contingency	  for	  a	  state	  in	  
transition	  that	  is	  attempting	  to	  reorder	  its	  systems.	  	  “Individual	  states	  have	  
increasingly	  limited	  room	  to	  maneuver	  and	  to	  pursue	  regulatory	  and	  policy	  options	  
that	  diverge	  significantly	  from	  those	  adopted	  by	  other	  states,	  as	  they	  are	  in	  
competition	  with	  each	  other	  for	  resources	  and	  investment.”121	  
	  
C.	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  the	  Neoliberal	  Package	  
Freedom	  under	  the	  global	  hegemony	  comes	  as	  a	  package.	  	  Liberalism	  is	  assumed	  to	  
be	  the	  cure-­‐all	  for	  the	  world’s	  problems.	  	  Liberals	  believe	  that	  when	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  
democracy	  and	  capitalism	  are	  all	  working	  in	  unison	  within	  a	  state,	  there	  is	  no	  way	  
that	  the	  state	  cannot	  be	  developing.	  	  However,	  Amy	  Chua	  points	  to	  a	  tension	  in	  this	  
system:	  “The	  prevailing	  view	  among	  globalization’s	  supporters	  is	  that	  markets	  and	  
democracy	  are	  a	  kind	  of	  universal	  prescription	  for	  the	  multiple	  ills	  of	  
underdevelopment.”122	  	  She	  continues,	  “Working	  hand	  in	  hand,	  markets	  and	  
democracy	  will	  gradually	  transform	  the	  world	  into	  a	  community	  of	  prosperous,	  war-­‐
shunning	  nations,	  and	  individuals	  into	  liberal,	  civic-­‐minded	  citizens	  and	  
consumers.”123	  	  But,	  as	  will	  be	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  upcoming	  sections,	  the	  ardent	  
faith	  in	  this	  package	  leads	  to	  a	  series	  of	  false	  contingencies	  that	  are	  propagated	  by	  
the	  global	  hegemony	  through	  its	  international	  organizations	  and	  financial	  
institutions.	  
	  
1.	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law	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Assuming	  a	  neoliberal	  transition,	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  economics,	  and	  politics	  are	  meant	  
to	  be	  a	  coordinated	  effort	  in	  integrating	  a	  state	  into	  the	  global	  economic	  order	  of	  a	  
free	  market	  democracy	  under	  the	  control	  of	  law.	  	  Law	  is	  essential	  in	  solidifying	  and	  
supporting	  the	  pillars	  of	  democracy	  and	  open	  markets.	  	  Rittich	  highlights,	  “The	  
successful	  pursuit	  of	  economic	  development	  is	  now	  explicitly	  conceived	  as	  a	  matter	  
of	  law,	  institutions	  and	  ‘good	  governance’.”124	  	  Many	  scholars	  agree	  with	  Rittich	  in	  
her	  assertion	  that	  development	  and	  law	  come	  in	  tandem.	  	  John	  Ohnesorge	  stresses	  
that	  law	  and	  development	  place	  legal	  functions	  at	  the	  center	  of	  the	  development	  
agenda.125	  	  	  
Law	  development	  is	  at	  the	  foundation	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  liberal	  development.	  	  
Rittich	  examines	  the	  role	  of	  market-­‐centered	  orthodoxy	  in	  the	  transitioning	  of	  
undeveloped	  states.	  	  She	  displays	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  ideology	  of	  
restructuring	  and	  the	  legal	  instruments	  used	  to	  fulfill	  the	  transition.	  	  She	  writes,	  
“Rather,	  transition	  itself	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  crucial	  moment	  in	  the	  consolidation	  of	  a	  
consensus	  around	  the	  demands	  of	  markets-­‐centered	  growth	  and	  the	  site	  of	  a	  
particularly	  intense	  effort	  to	  establish	  its	  institutional	  form.”126	  
Law	  is	  essentially	  the	  connecting	  thread	  used	  in	  establishing	  a	  liberal	  
institutional	  form.	  	  These	  moments	  have	  occurred	  in	  the	  past	  as	  seen	  in	  Tamanah’s	  
The	  Primacy	  of	  Society	  and	  the	  Failures	  of	  Law	  and	  Development.127	  	  One	  can	  see	  from	  
the	  period	  of	  decolonization	  that	  Parsons	  distinguishes	  also	  as	  the	  time	  of	  
“modernization.”128	  	  During	  this	  time,	  the	  belief	  was	  to	  modernize	  a	  state,	  four	  
societal	  institutions	  need	  to	  be	  developed	  including:	  the	  bureaucratic	  governmental	  
apparatus,	  capitalist	  market	  systems,	  “generalized	  universalistic	  legal	  systems,”	  and	  
democratic	  political	  systems.129	  	  “Legal	  development	  was	  seen	  as	  a	  concomitant	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aspect	  of	  economic	  and	  political	  development	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  market	  
regimes	  and	  government	  require	  legal	  backbones.”130	  
These	  beliefs	  persisted	  through	  time	  even	  if	  they	  no	  longer	  fell	  under	  the	  
moniker	  of	  “modernization.”	  	  In	  the	  1990s,	  the	  belief	  that	  legal	  infrastructure	  was	  
seminal	  to	  economic	  development	  in	  times	  of	  transition	  continued.	  	  Rittich	  outlines	  
this	  ideology,	  “Growth	  can	  only	  be	  expected	  in	  law-­‐based	  societies	  that	  protect	  
private	  rights,	  resist	  special	  interests,	  and	  prevent	  the	  arbitrary	  interference	  of	  the	  
state	  in	  the	  economy.”131	  	  Even	  today,	  after	  the	  many	  changes	  ushered	  in	  after	  the	  
fall	  of	  the	  communist	  bloc	  and	  the	  rise	  of	  the	  war	  on	  terror,	  development	  ideologies	  
still	  regard	  law	  reform	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  politico-­‐economics	  as	  a	  major	  crux	  of	  
development.	  	  As	  Tamanaha	  posits,	  law	  is	  fundamental	  in	  economic	  development	  
because	  it	  has	  the	  capacity	  through	  its	  infrastructure	  to	  influence	  social,	  economic	  
and	  political	  elements.132	  	  The	  main	  purpose	  behind	  the	  central	  position	  of	  law	  has	  
to	  do	  with	  its	  role	  in	  private	  property	  and	  markets,	  “The	  main	  thrust	  of	  today’s	  rule-­‐
of-­‐law	  projects	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  is	  to	  facilitate	  market	  activity	  (by	  
strengthening	  legislative	  and	  judicial	  protections	  of	  property	  and	  contract).”	  	  
However,	  Chua	  sees	  a	  flaw	  in	  the	  system:	  “To	  the	  extent	  that	  such	  initiatives	  
succeed,	  they	  will	  accomplish	  very	  significant	  achievements,	  but	  in	  the	  process	  they	  
may	  intensify	  the	  contest	  between	  unequal	  wealth	  and	  majoritarian	  politics.”133	  	  
There	  is	  discord	  in	  the	  law	  and	  development	  world	  because	  as	  time	  has	  
moved	  forward,	  there	  is	  puzzlement	  as	  to	  why	  these	  ‘underdeveloped’	  regions	  are	  
not	  keeping	  up.	  	  Much	  of	  the	  problem	  seems	  to	  arise	  from	  the	  tension	  between	  
universal	  ideologies	  coming	  from	  the	  West	  and	  the	  realities	  of	  the	  legal-­‐politico-­‐
economic	  features	  of	  a	  state	  such	  as	  Myanmar.	  	  It	  is	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  
universalist	  approach	  and	  the	  realities	  in	  certain	  states	  that	  the	  approach	  is	  not	  
compatible	  with.	  	  As	  Rittich	  suggests,	  “There	  is	  now	  what	  approaches	  a	  universal	  
template	  for	  market	  reform	  and	  development.	  	  Rather	  than	  a	  series	  of	  discrete	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initiatives	  and	  projects	  tailored	  to	  the	  needs	  of	  particular	  states	  in	  specific	  contexts,	  
market	  reform	  projects	  have	  increasingly	  taken	  the	  form	  of	  common	  or	  general	  
prescriptions.”134	  	  Rittich	  then	  goes	  on	  to	  describe	  the	  crucial	  role	  international	  
institutions	  play	  in	  the	  prominence	  of	  legal	  structure	  in	  economic	  development.	  	  
“Market	  reform	  has	  given	  these	  institutions	  new	  visibility	  and	  heightened	  
importance	  in	  the	  international	  order.135	  	  	  
It	  is	  this	  belief	  in	  the	  universality	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  that	  creates	  the	  discord	  
that	  disallows	  the	  flexibility	  and	  differences	  needed	  in	  a	  social	  context.	  	  Chua	  argues	  
that	  particular	  characteristics	  of	  developing	  countries	  make	  the	  conflict	  between	  
democracy	  and	  capitalism	  particularly	  difficult	  to	  overcome.136	  	  Law	  must	  have	  the	  
respect	  of	  the	  populace,	  but	  it	  must	  also	  serve	  the	  needs	  of	  the	  populace.	  	  One	  does	  
not	  come	  before	  the	  other;	  they	  must	  develop	  at	  the	  same	  time.137	  	  Tamanaha	  points	  
to	  the	  complexities	  of	  the	  realities	  that	  conflict	  with	  this	  universalist	  approach,	  “The	  
fundamental	  problem	  is	  that	  factors	  that	  influence	  law	  extend	  far	  beyond	  law	  
itself.”138	  	  Factors	  such	  as	  history,	  tradition,	  culture	  of	  a	  society,	  political	  and	  
economic	  systems	  and	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth	  and	  power,	  plus	  a	  myriad	  of	  other	  
factors,	  all	  play	  roles.	  	  He	  argues	  that	  development	  efforts	  break	  apart	  because	  the	  
societies	  they	  are	  imposed	  upon	  do	  not	  share	  the	  same	  economic,	  political	  and	  
judicial	  underpinnings	  that	  the	  originals	  states	  had.139	  	  Tamanaha,	  Rittich	  and	  Chua	  
suggest	  that	  there	  is	  not	  a	  universal	  template	  for	  development,	  and	  perhaps	  it	  is	  
some	  of	  these	  Western	  institutions	  and	  ideologies	  that	  are,	  not	  only	  making	  
development	  difficult	  for	  marginalized	  states	  to	  develop,	  but	  are	  actually	  to	  blame	  
for	  perpetuating	  the	  marginalization.	  	  The	  law	  does	  not	  end	  up	  working	  for	  the	  
developing	  state.	  	  Instead,	  it	  acts	  as	  a	  false	  contingency	  that	  the	  state	  believes	  it	  will	  
benefit	  from,	  when	  in	  actuality,	  law	  development	  is	  benefiting	  only	  the	  systems	  it	  
originated	  from,	  i.e.,	  the	  hegemonic	  states	  and	  institutions.	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2.	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  Democratization	  
A	  similar	  dynamic	  is	  at	  work	  in	  the	  liberal	  tenet	  of	  democratization.	  	  The	  
overwhelming	  faith	  in	  such	  a	  benign	  concept	  of	  democratic	  rule	  leaves	  out	  much	  of	  
the	  complexities	  that	  come	  along	  with	  democracy.	  	  However,	  democracy	  is	  firmly	  
encapsulated	  in	  the	  package	  of	  Rittich’s	  best	  practices	  and	  is	  universally	  held	  as	  the	  
most	  aspired	  form	  of	  governance.	  	  But,	  this	  unflinching	  adherence	  to	  democracy	  
gives	  rise	  to	  its	  own	  problems	  when	  unprepared	  and	  uninitiated	  countries	  embrace	  
democracy	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  global	  hegemony.	  
There	  is	  the	  argument	  that	  perhaps	  the	  pillars	  of	  liberalism,	  property	  and	  
democracy,	  may	  actually	  be	  incompatible.	  	  This	  is	  because	  as	  long	  as	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  in	  
wealth	  between	  some	  with	  wealth	  and	  many	  without,	  the	  many	  will	  want	  to	  use	  
suffrage	  to	  get	  what	  the	  some	  have.	  140	  	  Chua	  proposes	  the,	  “Inherent	  instability	  in	  
free	  market	  democracy.”141	  	  By	  using	  the	  ideas	  of	  some	  of	  history’s	  most	  prominent	  
thinkers,	  such	  as	  Adam	  Smith,	  she	  examines	  free	  market	  democracy	  from	  its	  outset.	  	  
She	  questions	  whether	  certain	  Western	  countries	  surpassed	  this	  paradox	  in	  the	  last	  
200	  years,	  and	  whether	  the	  currently	  developing	  countries	  will	  be	  able	  to	  do	  the	  
same	  and	  if	  so	  by	  using	  what	  means.142	  	  Using	  Thomas	  Babinton	  Macaulay’s	  work	  as	  
evidence,	  she	  demonstrates	  how	  universal	  suffrage	  is	  incompatible	  with	  property.	  
Chua	  bases	  her	  overall	  argument	  on	  four	  points.	  	  The	  first	  is	  that	  the	  West	  has	  been	  
able	  to	  mediate	  the	  paradox	  via	  material,	  political	  and	  ideological	  means.	  	  “Second,	  
these	  developed-­‐world	  mediating	  devices	  are	  largely	  absent	  from	  the	  developing	  
world,	  and	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  assume	  that	  they	  will	  be	  spontaneously	  generated	  
by	  market	  and	  democratic	  reforms.”143	  	  Third,	  the	  paradox	  is	  far	  more	  potentially	  
dangerous	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  	  “Universal	  suffrage	  is	  generally	  being	  
implemented	  in	  the	  developing	  world	  on	  a	  rapid,	  large-­‐scale	  basis	  that	  contrasts	  
sharply	  with	  the	  very	  gradual	  and	  incremental	  enfranchisement	  characteristic	  of	  the	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history	  of	  Western	  democratization.”144	  	  Fourth,	  it	  is	  unwise	  to	  promote	  these	  two	  
pillars	  of	  development	  to	  the	  developing	  world	  because	  they	  do	  not	  have	  the	  
institutions	  that	  are	  able	  to	  attenuate	  the	  tension	  between	  the	  free	  markets	  and	  
democracy.145	  	  She	  contends	  that	  we	  need	  to	  think	  long	  and	  hard	  about	  how	  it	  is	  that	  
the	  West	  was	  able	  to	  somehow	  marry	  two	  disparate	  entities,	  democracy	  and	  
capitalism,	  and	  whether	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  world	  could	  or	  should	  be	  obliged	  to	  follow.146	  	  	  
Chua	  posits	  that	  group	  and	  ethnic	  violence	  are	  the	  result	  of	  this	  aggressive	  
spread	  of	  markets	  and	  democracy.	  	  The	  market	  minorities	  are	  the	  center	  of	  this	  
hegemony	  that	  imposes	  these	  institutions.	  	  She	  posits	  that,	  “Markets	  concentrate	  
enormous	  wealth	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  an	  “outsider”	  minority,	  fomenting	  ethnic	  envy	  and	  
hatred	  among	  often	  chronically	  poor	  majorities.”147	  	  She	  continues,	  
Introducing	  democracy	  in	  these	  circumstances	  does	  not	  transform	  
voters	  into	  open-­‐minded	  cocitizens	  in	  a	  national	  community.	  	  Rather,	  
the	  competition	  for	  votes	  fosters	  the	  emergence	  of	  demagogues	  who	  
scapegoat	  the	  resented	  minority	  and	  foment	  active	  ethnonationalist	  
movements	  demanding	  that	  the	  country’s	  wealth	  and	  identity	  be	  
reclaimed	  by	  the	  ‘true	  owners	  of	  the	  nation.’148	  
	  
This	  same	  dynamic	  can	  also	  be	  transplanted	  on	  a	  state	  that	  may	  have	  numerous	  
smaller	  minorities	  that	  add	  up	  to	  being	  a	  substantial	  portion	  of	  the	  population	  that	  
is	  marginalized	  by	  a	  single,	  central	  ethnicity.	  
	   The	  issue	  with	  democratizing	  these	  kinds	  of	  states	  is	  similar	  to	  the	  simplified	  
universal	  approach	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  with	  law.	  	  Each	  state	  has	  its	  
own	  various	  difficulties	  that	  present	  obstacles	  to	  democratization.	  	  What	  works	  in	  
Western	  Europe	  or	  North	  America	  does	  not	  necessarily	  transplant	  to	  other	  regions	  
of	  the	  world.	  	  The	  different	  histories,	  cultures,	  ethnicities	  and	  economies	  all	  play	  a	  
central	  role	  in	  how	  a	  state	  defines	  democracy	  and	  how	  it	  implements	  it.	  	  In	  certain	  
states,	  simply	  holding	  fair	  elections	  that	  will	  be	  embraced	  by	  the	  population	  without	  
tension	  is	  a	  difficult	  task.	  	  To	  assume	  an	  easy	  process	  of	  democratization	  does	  not	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account	  for	  the	  considerable	  limits	  and	  pressures	  that	  each	  individual	  state	  may	  be	  
subject	  to	  and	  results	  in	  promoting	  false	  contingencies	  for	  a	  state	  such	  as	  Myanmar.	  
	  
3.	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  Free	  Markets	  
Finally,	  the	  liberal	  tenet	  of	  free	  markets	  and	  capitalism	  represents	  another	  false	  
contingency	  propagated	  by	  neoliberalism.	  	  It	  is	  based	  off	  of	  Unger’s	  indivisibility	  
idea	  that	  a	  system	  such	  as	  democracy	  cannot	  operate	  without	  the	  coordination	  of	  a	  
capitalist	  economy.	  	  Free	  market	  capitalism	  has	  been	  seen	  as	  ubiquitous	  with	  
economic	  success.	  	  The	  international	  financial	  institutions	  encourage	  transitioning	  
economies	  to	  view	  the	  supposedly	  unlimited	  potential	  of	  their	  economic	  policies.	  	  In	  
actuality,	  their	  influence	  is	  a	  pressure	  that	  leaves	  transitioning	  economies	  with	  few	  
genuine	  contingencies.	  
Currently,	  the	  non-­‐maneuverability	  of	  a	  state	  to	  pursue	  its	  own	  policies	  is	  
manifested	  in	  the	  ability	  of	  these	  least	  developed	  states	  to	  use	  their	  resources	  on	  
their	  poorest	  communities.	  	  Rittich	  posits	  that	  economic	  growth	  does	  not	  coincide	  
with	  welfare.	  	  “Attempts	  to	  induce	  greater	  economic	  growth	  through	  restructuring,	  
even	  if	  they	  produce	  material	  progress	  for	  society	  in	  the	  aggregate,	  are	  not	  
experienced	  as	  a	  single,	  homogeneous	  event	  nor	  do	  their	  benefits	  accrue	  evenly	  to	  
different	  sectors	  of	  the	  population.”	  	  For	  example,	  Tamanaha	  points	  out	  that	  
democracy	  has	  made	  massive	  gains	  throughout	  the	  world	  since	  the	  1970s.	  	  But,	  he	  
argues	  that	  one	  billion	  people	  still	  experience	  extreme	  poverty	  with	  another	  billion	  
fairing	  barely	  much	  better.149	  
According	  to	  neoliberal	  theory,	  concerns	  such	  as	  alleviating	  poverty	  
or	  inequality	  are	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  not	  by	  altering	  these	  preferred	  
market	  structures,	  as	  such	  efforts	  have	  proven	  both	  ineffective	  and	  
inefficient	  where	  they	  have	  not	  lead	  to	  complete	  economic	  disaster.	  	  
Instead,	  the	  proper	  solution	  is	  to	  provide	  limited	  form	  of	  
redistribution	  by	  the	  state	  that	  are	  targeted	  and	  carefully	  confined	  to	  
the	  most	  needy.150	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Rittich	  argues	  that	  this	  uneven	  disbursement	  of	  wealth	  appears	  to	  be	  structural	  
within	  the	  transformation.151	  	  “In	  the	  neoliberal	  vision,	  the	  state	  is	  positioned	  
largely	  as	  the	  handmaid	  or	  servant	  of	  the	  market;	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  state	  must	  be	  
subordinated	  to	  the	  demands	  of	  economic	  growth.”152	  	  But,	  when	  a	  state’s	  role	  
becomes	  seriously	  limited	  through	  practices	  such	  as	  privatization	  and	  deregulation,	  
being	  the	  servant	  of	  the	  market	  and	  influencing	  wealth	  disbursement	  is	  increasingly	  
difficult.	  
The	  normalization	  of	  neoliberal	  ideals	  oversimplifies	  the	  roles	  of	  both	  the	  
market	  and	  the	  state.	  	  This	  over	  simplification	  creates	  a	  situation	  whereby	  any	  kind	  
of	  state	  involvement	  within	  the	  economy	  is	  seen	  as	  threatening.	  	  The	  corollary	  of	  
this	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  a	  state	  to	  influence	  distributional	  forces	  within	  a	  society	  is	  
suppressed,	  inevitably	  creating	  inequalities.153	  	  Free	  market	  policies	  inevitably	  
divert	  the	  capital	  away	  from	  the	  host	  state	  and	  the	  host	  state	  is	  unable	  to	  retaliate	  
through	  law.	  	  Daniel	  Augenstein	  demonstrates	  this	  dynamic:	  “’Multi-­‐national’	  
corporations	  remain	  subject	  to	  the	  domestic	  laws	  of	  the	  states	  in	  which	  they	  reside,	  
and	  often	  rely	  on	  these	  laws	  for	  the	  regulation	  and	  enforcement	  of	  their	  business	  
transactions.”154	  	  Unger	  asserts	  that	  developing	  countries	  that	  are	  transitioning	  to	  
neoliberal	  policies	  discover	  too	  late	  that	  foreign	  capital	  is	  more	  useful	  the	  less	  it	  is	  
depended	  on	  because	  capital	  inflows	  are	  not	  sustained	  enough	  in	  countries	  that	  are	  
investing	  and	  consuming	  beyond	  their	  means.	  	  While	  on	  the	  developing	  state’s	  side,	  
the	  inflows	  restart	  high	  inflation	  and	  decrease	  the	  government’s	  effective	  rule	  over	  
the	  economy.155	  	  But,	  the	  argument	  is	  that	  this	  is	  all	  just	  a	  part	  of	  some	  natural	  
process.	  	  
A	  common	  narrative	  of	  development	  in	  the	  West	  is	  that	  there	  is	  a	  
hierarchical	  distribution	  of	  production.	  	  This	  hierarchy	  is	  dependent	  on	  the	  level	  of	  
development	  in	  each	  state,	  but	  each	  state	  is	  constantly	  evolving	  with	  the	  lesser-­‐
developed	  states	  eventually	  meeting	  up	  with	  their	  more	  developed	  peers.	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“Developing	  economies	  must	  pass,	  for	  example,	  through	  a	  protracted	  phase	  of	  low-­‐
wage,	  export-­‐oriented	  production.”156	  
	   A	  dominant	  neoliberal	  technique	  for	  traversing	  this	  phase	  of	  production	  and	  
separating	  state	  involvement	  from	  the	  economy	  is	  privatization.	  	  It	  often	  
accompanies	  the	  neoliberalizing	  of	  an	  economy	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  by	  practice	  
throughout	  Latin	  America	  and	  Eastern	  Europe.157	  	  However,	  as	  Beatrice	  Hibou	  
demonstrates,	  this	  is	  not	  a	  simple,	  natural	  process	  like	  the	  hegemonic	  rhetoric	  
would	  have	  states	  and	  their	  citizens	  believe.	  	  Hibou	  argues	  that	  privatization	  is	  more	  
of	  a	  transition	  in	  the	  modes	  of	  governing.	  	  It	  transcends	  the	  economy.	  	  It	  is	  a	  
transformation	  from	  direct	  management	  of	  enterprises	  to	  the	  management	  of	  
society’s	  modernization	  policies	  and	  its	  foreign	  economic	  relations.158	  	  The	  power	  
differential	  only	  plays	  into	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  corporation’s	  business	  and	  
governmental	  elites.	  	  As	  Unger	  writes,	  “The	  perversion	  of	  economic	  growth	  and	  its	  
fruits	  begins	  when	  we	  attempt	  to	  make	  up	  for	  the	  scarcity	  of	  public	  goods	  by	  
producing	  more	  private	  ones,	  and	  to	  find	  in	  private	  consumption	  a	  barren	  solace	  for	  
social	  frustration.”159	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V.	  	  	  Myanmar	  and	  its	  False	  Contingencies:	  Freedom	  and	  
Constraint	  
	  
Anywhere	  one	  finds	  something	  to	  read	  about	  Myanmar,	  one	  of	  the	  first	  things	  they	  
will	  encounter	  is	  a	  discussion	  about	  its	  transition.160	  	  Though	  the	  transition	  began	  
economically	  in	  the	  late	  1980s	  and	  early	  1990s,	  it	  has	  picked	  up	  momentum	  since	  
the	  ruling	  party	  announced	  the	  ratification	  of	  a	  new	  constitution	  in	  2008.161	  	  Ideally,	  
Myanmar	  is	  a	  sovereign	  state	  that	  is	  capable	  of	  its	  own	  agency	  and	  decision-­‐making.	  	  
Its	  transition	  should	  not	  fall	  prey	  to	  Unger’s	  false	  necessities	  of	  the	  globalized	  
world’s	  single-­‐track	  policies	  of	  governance	  and	  economy.	  	  Its	  systems	  of	  governance	  
should	  not	  be	  determined	  by	  any	  outside	  influence,	  and	  it	  should	  have	  access	  to	  a	  
myriad	  of	  combinations	  out	  of	  which	  it	  can	  form	  its	  own	  politics	  and	  economy.	  	  
Myanmar	  has	  been	  one	  of	  the	  last	  bastions	  against	  the	  assimilating	  order	  we	  have	  
discussed	  as	  globalization.	  	  Today,	  the	  international	  community	  is	  trying	  to	  bring	  
Myanmar	  into	  the	  fold.	  	  The	  forces	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter	  are	  weighing	  
down	  on	  Myanmar	  in	  many	  ways.	  	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  Myanmar	  is	  one	  example	  
of	  the	  lack	  of	  agency	  discussed	  in	  the	  previous	  chapter.	  	  The	  country	  is	  not	  so	  much	  
transitioning	  by	  its	  own	  accord	  as	  it	  is	  assimilating	  out	  of	  necessity	  at	  the	  hands	  of	  
much	  more	  powerful	  institutions.	  	  	  
	   This	  chapter	  will	  present	  three	  arguments	  displaying	  false	  contingencies	  at	  
work	  within	  and	  outside	  of	  the	  nation-­‐state.	  	  First,	  it	  will	  analyze	  Myanmar’s	  post-­‐
colonial	  history	  and	  the	  tension	  caused	  by	  the	  different	  ethnicities	  vying	  for	  
recognition	  and	  power.	  	  This	  dynamic	  has	  been	  long	  at	  work	  in	  Myanmar,	  and	  it	  is	  
still	  a	  major	  obstacle	  in	  the	  way	  of	  any	  kind	  of	  genuine	  democratization.	  	  Myanmar’s	  
history	  of	  ethnic	  tensions	  coupled	  with	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  the	  military	  regime	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
160	  See	  Daniel	  Rothenberg,	  Burma’s	  Democratic	  Transition:	  The	  Internationalization	  of	  Justice,	  the	  
Challenge	  of	  Legitimacy,	  and	  the	  Necessity	  of	  Facing	  Past	  Political	  Violence,	  HUM.	  RTS.	  BRIEF	  (2002),	  
Baladas	  Ghoshal,	  Democratic	  Transition	  in	  Myanmar:	  Challenges	  Ahead,	  IND.	  Q.	  (2013),	  BALBIR	  B.	  
BHASIN,	  BUSINESS	  AND	  INVESTMENT	  OPPORTUNITIES	  IN	  EMERGING	  MYANMAR,	  Bus.	  Expert	  Press	  
1-­‐172	  (2014),	  Moe	  Thuzar,	  Myanmar:	  No	  Turning	  Back,	  S.E.	  ASIAN	  AFF.	  (2012).	  
161	  See	  Xinhua,	  Myanmar	  formally	  announces	  ratification	  of	  new	  constitution	  draft,	  People’s	  Daily	  
Online	  (May,	  2008)	  (accessed	  at	  http://en.people.cn/90001/90777/90851/6421254.html	  May,	  
2015).	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make	  actual	  concessions	  makes	  the	  contingencies	  offered	  by	  democratization	  false.	  	  
Secondly,	  this	  chapter	  analyzes	  the	  current	  liberalizing	  of	  the	  Myanmar	  
macroeconomics	  to	  display	  that	  the	  very	  same	  rhetoric	  that	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  
World	  Bank	  and	  other	  neoliberal	  entities	  have	  been	  espousing	  for	  over	  20	  years	  are	  
still	  at	  work	  and	  still	  putting	  a	  stranglehold	  on	  countries	  such	  as	  Myanmar.	  	  The	  
neoliberalising	  of	  Myanmar’s	  economy	  is	  not	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  citizens	  of	  
Myanmar	  but	  for	  the	  distribution	  of	  their	  resources	  and	  capital	  elsewhere.	  	  Finally,	  
this	  chapter	  will	  demonstrate	  how	  a	  new	  human	  rights	  commission	  is	  being	  
initiated	  at	  the	  request	  of	  the	  international	  community.	  	  It	  is	  meant	  to	  placate	  
international	  institutions	  and	  human	  rights	  groups,	  but	  in	  actually	  does	  not	  fulfill	  
the	  effects	  wanted	  by	  the	  liberal	  activists	  in	  Myanmar.	  	  None	  of	  these	  reforms	  taking	  
place	  are	  likely	  to	  give	  the	  citizens	  of	  Myanmar	  any	  power	  to	  make	  the	  transition	  
they	  would	  like	  to	  see	  their	  country	  traverse.	  	  This	  chapter’s	  purpose	  is	  to	  
demonstrate	  that	  the	  power	  dynamics	  of	  neoliberalism	  and	  globalization	  are	  at	  
work	  making	  the	  false	  contingencies	  of	  Myanmar’s	  transition.	  
	  
A.	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  Democratization	  in	  Myanmar	  
The	  NLD	  and	  liberal	  activists	  of	  Myanmar	  have	  a	  very	  daunting	  task	  in	  front	  of	  them.	  	  
The	  next	  round	  of	  presidential	  elections	  is	  later	  in	  this	  year,	  2015.162	  	  If	  democracy	  
is	  what	  the	  people	  of	  Myanmar	  strive	  for,	  it	  is	  certainly	  the	  system	  that	  they	  should	  
receive.	  	  However,	  this	  system	  is	  being	  handed	  over	  to	  them	  from	  a	  military	  junta	  
that	  has	  controlled	  Myanmar	  since	  the	  1960s.	  	  This	  section	  does	  not	  argue	  that	  
democracy	  is	  a	  poor	  choice	  of	  governance.	  	  But,	  it	  does	  demonstrate	  the	  problems	  
democracy	  represents	  in	  the	  context	  of	  Myanmar’s	  history	  and	  politics.	  	  Myanmar	  
has	  a	  very	  long	  and	  intricate	  history	  of	  ethnic	  conflict	  due	  to	  the	  organization	  of	  the	  
state	  both	  before	  and	  after	  colonization.	  	  There	  are	  also	  elements	  in	  Myanmar’s	  
current	  political	  structure,	  such	  as	  its	  constitution,	  that	  further	  complicate	  the	  
process.	  	  I	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  democracy	  in	  Myanmar,	  in	  its	  current	  form,	  creates	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
162	  Tin	  Aung	  Khine,	  Myanmar	  Election	  Body	  Says	  No	  Change	  in	  2015	  Vote	  Campaign	  Format,	  RADIO	  
FREE	  ASIA	  (Sep,	  2014),	  http://www.rfa.org/english/news/myanmar/election-­‐
05092014204140.html.	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the	  belief	  that	  there	  are	  contingencies	  for	  the	  liberal	  supporters	  of	  Myanmar.	  	  
However,	  many	  of	  these	  contingencies	  are	  unavailable	  due	  to	  the	  political	  history,	  
ethnic	  conflicts,	  and	  current	  political	  structure	  of	  Myanmar.	  
To	  begin,	  it	  is	  integral	  to	  view	  Myanmar	  as	  it	  was	  during	  its	  colonial	  period.	  	  
What	  is	  seen	  on	  the	  map	  today	  of	  contemporary	  Myanmar	  is	  not	  quite	  the	  same	  as	  it	  
would	  have	  looked	  before	  WWII.	  	  Before	  the	  British	  came,	  the	  region	  of	  Myanmar	  
was	  an	  incredibly	  ethnically	  diverse	  region	  that	  included,	  and	  still	  includes,	  the	  
tribes	  of	  the	  Shan,	  Burman,	  Kachin,	  Mon,	  Karen,	  and	  more.163	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  
was	  an	  influx	  of	  South	  Asian	  immigrants	  who	  moved	  in	  with	  the	  British	  from	  mainly	  
India	  and	  what	  is	  now	  Bangladesh.	  164	  	  There	  are	  to	  this	  day	  remnants	  of	  these	  
immigrant	  communities,	  most	  notably	  the	  Rohingyas.165	  	  	  The	  efforts	  to	  create	  the	  
nation	  of	  Burma	  was	  a	  difficult	  task	  for	  the	  British	  colonizers	  due	  to	  their	  trying	  to	  
transplant	  Western	  organizational	  and	  political	  structures	  on	  an	  unfamiliar	  people	  
and	  the	  limited	  amount	  of	  time	  the	  British	  occupied	  Myanmar.166	  	  Their	  solution	  in	  
colonial	  Myanmar	  has	  had	  tremendous	  consequences.	  
	   The	  majority	  of	  Myanmar	  citizens	  are	  ethnically	  Bamar.167	  	  However,	  there	  
are	  seven	  other	  major	  ethnicities	  recognized	  by	  the	  state.168	  	  The	  Bamar	  have	  
traditionally	  lived	  in	  what	  geographically	  would	  be	  the	  center/central	  plain	  of	  
Myanmar.	  	  Many	  of	  the	  minorities	  are	  located	  at	  the	  exterior	  and	  surrounding	  
mountains	  of	  the	  state.	  	  Not	  only	  were	  they	  ethnically	  and	  geographically	  isolated,	  
but	  many	  of	  the	  political	  and	  religious	  ideologies	  were	  diverse	  as	  well.169	  	  The	  
minorities	  traditionally	  enjoyed	  substantial	  autonomy.	  	  When	  the	  British	  tried	  to	  
govern	  the	  region,	  they	  devised	  a	  strategy	  called	  the	  Burma	  Frontier	  Service	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163	  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  5.	  
164	  Id,	  at	  23.	  
165	  See	  Ivan	  Watson	  and	  Tim	  Schwarz,	  Myanmar:	  Rohingya	  not	  welcome,	  CNN	  (Nov,	  2014),	  
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/11/world/asia/myanmar-­‐rohingya-­‐minority/.	  
166	  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  32.	  
167	  See	  GUIDE	  FOR	  MYANMAR,	  http://www.guideformyanmar.com/people.html.	  (last	  visited	  May	  17,	  
2015)	  (The	  census	  numbers	  are	  almost	  completely	  unreliable,	  but	  it	  is	  generally	  accepted	  that	  the	  
Bamars	  are	  a	  majority	  with	  potentially	  about	  two	  thirds	  of	  the	  population),	  	  
168	  MARTIN	  SMITH,	  ETHNIC	  GROUPS	  IN	  BURMA:	  DEVELOPMENT,	  DEMOCRACY,	  AND	  HUMAN	  
RIGHTS	  17	  (Anti-­‐Slavery	  Int’l	  1994).	  
169	  The	  tribes	  Kachin	  and	  Karen	  both	  have	  Christian	  communities,	  and	  there	  has	  been	  a	  communist	  
faction	  present	  in	  Myanmar	  since	  pre-­‐independence.	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1922.	  This	  was	  an	  administrative	  step	  that	  divided	  Burma	  into	  two	  ministerial	  
regions	  subject	  to	  separate	  constitutional	  reforms.170	  	  As	  Myanmar	  was	  gaining	  
independence	  the	  Frontier	  areas	  remained,	  
According	  to	  the	  British	  White	  Paper	  of	  May	  1945,	  the	  Scheduled	  Area	  
[.	  .	  .]	  [remained]	  outside	  of	  “ministerial	  ‘	  Burma	  and	  thus	  outside	  	  the	  
authority	  of	  the	  Executive	  Council	  and	  directly	  under	  that	  of	  the	  
governor	  [.	  .	  .]	  The	  second	  Frontier	  Areas’	  Conference	  [.	  .	  .]	  mentioned	  
in	  the	  London	  Agreement…determined	  (sic)	  Frontier	  Area	  
representation	  in	  the	  Executive	  Council	  and	  the	  forthcoming	  
Constituent	  Assembly	  [.	  .	  .]	  the	  Frontier	  Areas	  would	  be	  brought	  
within	  the	  authority	  of	  the	  Executive	  Council	  on	  matters	  of	  ‘common	  
interest,’	  in	  such	  cases	  as	  defence	  (sic)	  and	  external	  affairs,	  ‘but	  
without	  prejudice	  to	  full	  internal	  autonomy.’171	  	  	  	  
	  
The	  Frontier	  areas	  also	  kept	  their	  internal	  administrative	  autonomy.	  	  However,	  once	  
full	  independence	  was	  gained	  from	  England,	  these	  areas	  immediately	  pushed	  for	  
their	  own	  independence.	  	  There	  were	  tremendous	  amounts	  of	  weapons	  left	  over	  
from	  the	  war,	  which	  contributed	  to	  the	  immediate	  tension	  that	  resulted	  from	  
independence	  and	  ethnic	  tensions.172	  	  It	  was	  a	  situation	  that	  alluded	  a	  solution	  as,	  
“Post-­‐independence	  Myanmar’s	  inability	  to	  attain	  the	  elusive	  goal	  of	  national	  unity	  
is	  exemplified	  by	  the	  incessant	  armed	  conflict	  between	  the	  central	  government	  and	  
a	  variety	  of	  insurgent	  groups	  that	  were	  either	  fighting	  for	  separation	  or	  autonomy,	  
or	  to	  establish	  a	  communist	  state.”173	  	  
Since	  1948,	  ethnic	  insurgencies	  have	  been	  a	  mainstay	  of	  Myanmar’s	  internal	  
politics.174	  	  The	  history	  is	  inextricably	  violent	  and	  riddled	  with	  human	  rights	  abuses:	  
“Researchers have documented the military's practice of systematically entering villages, 
raping and/or killing villagers they find, burning the village, and then setting landmines 
for those who may return to recover any belongings or loved ones.”175  The inexcusable 
tactics of the military have not resulted in fully suppressing these rebels.  Particularly	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170	  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  37.	  
171	  Id,	  at	  65.	  
172	  Id,	  at	  73.	  
173	  Thin	  Maung	  Maung	  Than,	  The	  essential	  tension:	  Democratization	  and	  the	  unitary	  state	  in	  Myanmar	  
(Burma),	  12	  S.E.	  ASIA	  RES.	  187,	  192	  (2004).	  
174	  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  73.	  
175	  Rachel	  E.	  Ryon,	  Foreigners	  in	  Burma:	  A	  Framework	  for	  Responsible	  Investment,	  23	  PAC.	  RIM	  L.	  &	  
POL’Y	  J.	  831,	  835	  (2014).	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the	  Northern	  Hill	  Tribes,	  the	  Karen	  and	  the	  Kachin,	  maintain	  these	  insurgencies	  to	  
this	  very	  day.	  	  A	  statement	  from	  Minority	  Rights	  Group	  International	  in	  July,	  2014	  
detailing	  some	  of	  the	  more	  recent	  conflicts	  highlights	  this:	  “Armed	  ethnic	  groups	  
continued	  to	  clash	  with	  government	  forces	  throughout	  the	  year,	  despite	  making	  
some	  progress	  on	  ceasefire	  negotiations.	  	  Fighting	  in	  Burma's	  northern	  Kachin	  state	  
reached	  its	  peak	  in	  January	  2013,	  when	  the	  military	  launched	  a	  full-­‐scale	  land	  and	  
aerial	  assault	  on	  the	  ethnic	  rebel	  stronghold	  in	  Laiza,	  killing	  civilians	  and	  forcing	  
thousands	  from	  their	  homes.”176	  	  The	  constant	  fighting	  has	  had	  a	  tremendous	  
impact	  on	  the	  state’s	  policies,	  but	  it	  is	  not	  the	  only	  factor	  contributing	  to	  the	  
complexity	  of	  Myanmar’s	  post-­‐independence	  history.	  
This	  is	  where	  a	  narrative	  of	  progress	  would	  allow	  the	  false	  contingencies	  of	  
Myanmar’s	  democratization	  to	  assist	  in	  the	  double	  bind	  that	  the	  marginalized,	  
informal	  community	  encounters	  with	  globalization.	  	  There	  has	  been	  scholarship	  
regarding	  what	  happens	  when	  democracy	  is	  transplanted	  in	  states	  with	  situations	  
such	  as	  Myanmar.	  	  Whether	  it	  is	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  or	  South	  East	  Asia,	  a	  
transitioning	  state	  is	  expected	  to	  hold	  elections	  as	  soon	  as	  any	  initial	  step	  towards	  
democratization	  has	  occurred.	  	  	  Elections	  are	  meant	  to	  weed	  out	  the	  corrupt	  and	  
self-­‐serving	  leaders	  and	  replace	  them	  with	  an	  authority	  capable	  of	  steering	  the	  
government	  and	  economy	  to	  oversee	  the	  best	  interests	  of	  the	  community.	  	  
Unfortunately,	  democracy	  involves	  far	  more	  than	  just	  elections,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  
oversimplifying	  that	  creates,	  
Today’s	  universal	  policy	  prescription	  for	  ‘underdevelopment,’	  shaped	  
and	  promulgated	  to	  a	  large	  extant	  by	  the	  United	  States,	  essentially	  
amounts	  to	  this.	  	  Take	  the	  rawest	  form	  of	  capitalism,	  slap	  it	  together	  
with	  the	  rawest	  form	  of	  democracy,	  and	  export	  the	  two	  as	  a	  package	  
deal	  to	  the	  poorest,	  most	  frustrated,	  most	  unstable,	  and	  most	  
desperate	  countries	  of	  the	  world.	  	  Add	  market-­‐dominant	  minorities	  to	  
the	  picture,	  and	  the	  instability	  inherent	  in	  this	  bareknuckle	  version	  of	  
free	  market	  democracy	  is	  compounded	  a	  thousand	  fold	  by	  the	  
manipulatable	  forces	  of	  ethnic	  hatred.177	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Chua	  gives	  perspective	  to	  an	  element	  of	  neoliberalism	  that	  she	  believes	  is	  causing	  
damage	  within	  developing	  states,	  “The	  relationship	  between	  free	  market	  democracy	  
and	  ethnic	  violence	  around	  the	  world	  is	  inextricably	  bound	  up	  with	  
globalization.”178	  	  The	  majority	  of	  globalization’s	  critics	  criticize	  it	  for	  the	  disparity	  it	  
foments	  between	  classes.	  	  She	  argues	  that	  another	  crucial	  factor	  in	  the	  critique	  of	  
globalization	  is	  that	  it	  also	  instigates	  ethnic	  hatred.179	  	  	  
Ethnic	  hatred	  is	  particularly	  relevant	  in	  Myanmar.	  	  Thin	  Maung	  Maung	  Than	  
writes,	  “The	  non-­‐Bamar	  groups’	  perceptions	  of	  the	  majority	  Bamar	  dominance	  in	  
ethnic	  relations	  have	  been	  a	  contentious	  political	  issue	  in	  independent	  Myanmar,	  
with	  far-­‐reaching	  implications	  for	  building	  a	  democratic	  state	  premised	  upon	  
national	  unity.”180	  	  In	  her	  book	  World	  on	  Fire,	  Chua	  explores	  the	  dynamic	  in	  
countries	  that	  have	  a	  politically/economically	  powerful	  minority	  and	  a	  marginalized	  
ethnic	  majority.	  	  Chua	  writes	  that	  in,	  “countries	  with	  a	  market-­‐dominant	  minority	  
and	  a	  poor	  ‘indigenous’	  majority,	  the	  forces	  of	  democratization	  and	  marketization	  
directly	  collide.	  	  As	  markets	  enrich	  the	  market-­‐dominant	  minority,	  democratization	  
increases	  the	  political	  voice	  and	  power	  of	  the	  frustrated	  majority.”181	  	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
Myanmar,	  the	  military-­‐elite,	  largely	  encompassed	  by	  the	  Burmese	  majority,	  are	  
largely	  the	  ones	  reaping	  the	  benefits	  from	  the	  current	  liberalizing	  of	  the	  markets.	  	  
The	  current	  president	  has	  even	  admitted	  to	  the	  vast	  corruption	  within	  the	  civil	  
services.182	  
There	  are	  fundamental	  tensions	  within	  the	  current	  democratic	  structure	  in	  
the	  unitary	  state.183	  	  Myanmar’s	  current	  house	  structure	  consists	  of	  essentially	  three	  
houses	  (hluttaws	  in	  Burmese):	  one	  of	  equal	  regional	  representation,	  one	  based	  on	  
population,	  and	  the	  third	  group	  of	  representatives	  nominated	  by	  the	  commander-­‐
and-­‐chief	  (who	  is	  not	  the	  president).	  	  Each	  group	  then	  nominates	  a	  vice	  president	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who	  is	  then	  chosen	  by	  the	  entire	  Electoral	  College	  to	  be	  the	  president.184	  	  The	  
president	  and	  commander-­‐in-­‐chief	  wield	  tremendous	  power	  in	  their	  ability	  to	  hand-­‐
pick	  the	  members	  they	  want	  serving	  in	  the	  top	  executive	  decisions:	  
Even	  when	  elected	  representatives	  are	  chosen	  to	  serve	  in	  the	  
government,	  they	  must	  forego	  their	  party	  affiliations.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  the	  
elected	  representatives’	  role	  in	  the	  hluttaws	  would	  generally	  be	  
confined	  to	  legislative	  and	  deliberative	  functions,	  and	  the	  raison	  
d’etre	  of	  competitive	  politics,	  that	  is,	  to	  form	  a	  government,	  would	  be	  
obviated.	  	  It	  effectively	  separates	  state	  power	  from	  political	  
competition	  and	  representation	  of	  voting	  constituencies.	  	  
Consequently	  it	  creates	  a	  corporatist,	  bureaucratic,	  unitary	  state	  with	  
centralized	  powers,	  in	  which	  the	  ruling	  elite	  are	  insulated	  from	  the	  
rough	  and	  tumble	  of	  electoral	  politics.	  	  The	  result	  should	  be	  a	  strong	  
regime	  in	  a	  centralized	  unitary	  state.185	  
	  
Myanmarese	  citizens’	  votes	  are	  essentially	  invalid	  in	  this	  structure.	  	  It	  is	  incredibly	  
easy	  for	  the	  previous	  military	  regime	  to	  remain	  in	  power	  because	  the	  positions	  that	  
the	  president	  and	  chief	  choose	  do	  not	  even	  have	  to	  be	  within	  the	  body	  politic.186	  	  	  
	   While	  Myanmar	  makes	  more	  and	  more	  progress	  by	  holding	  elections	  and	  
allowing	  citizens	  the	  opportunity	  to	  vote,	  there	  is	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  military	  ruling	  
class	  to	  keep	  hold	  of	  their	  positions	  and	  not	  actually	  allow	  for	  a	  transition	  towards	  
fair	  representation.	  	  But,	  as	  the	  newly	  represented	  peoples,	  especially	  the	  minority	  
regions,	  get	  a	  taste	  of	  representation,	  they	  will	  only	  have	  it	  stopped	  short	  of	  true	  
representation.	  	  Thus,	  potential	  for	  further	  ethnic	  violence	  is	  incredibly	  high.	  	  	  These	  
issues	  create	  very	  real	  problems	  for	  the	  institutionalizing	  of	  democracy	  within	  
Myanmar.	  	  With	  the	  tendency	  of	  non-­‐democratic	  states	  to	  rush	  the	  processes	  of	  
democratization,	  the	  ethnic	  variable,	  and	  the	  junta’s	  political	  stranglehold,	  the	  
prospects	  of	  genuine	  democratization	  are	  not	  promising.	  	  The	  democratic	  process	  
presents	  contingencies	  in	  Myanmar	  that	  are	  false	  until	  the	  state	  and	  its	  people	  are	  
able	  to	  work	  through	  the	  process	  themselves	  without	  the	  interference	  of	  the	  
international	  community’s	  universal	  approach.	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B.	  The	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  Myanmar’s	  Neoliberalizing	  Markets	  
A	  very	  similar	  dynamic	  to	  what	  I	  demonstrated	  with	  Myanmar’s	  democratization	  is	  
at	  work	  in	  the	  neoliberalizing	  of	  its	  economy.	  	  The	  indivisibility	  of	  democracy	  and	  
free	  markets	  is	  still	  very	  much	  alive	  and	  at	  work	  in	  Myanmar.	  	  This	  section	  displays	  
the	  steady	  road	  the	  state	  has	  taken	  towards	  opening	  up	  its	  markets	  to	  the	  
international	  community’s	  globalized	  economy.	  	  I	  will	  show	  that	  at	  no	  point	  in	  time	  
has	  receiving	  assistance	  from	  the	  international	  financial	  institutions	  ever	  actually	  
improved	  Myanmar’s	  dire	  economic	  circumstances.	  	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  failure,	  Myanmar	  
continues	  to	  make	  concessions.	  	  The	  success	  that	  is	  promised	  with	  the	  opening	  up	  of	  
Myanmar’s	  economy	  to	  globalized	  markets	  is	  another	  false	  contingency.	  	  This	  
section	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  Myanmar’s	  neoliberalizing	  has	  not	  only	  not	  been	  of	  its	  
own	  choosing,	  but	  it	  also	  does	  not	  bring	  with	  it	  the	  supposed	  promises	  of	  success	  to	  
Myanmar’s	  many	  economically	  maligned	  citizens.	  
To	  understand	  Myanmar’s	  politico-­‐economics	  one	  must	  be	  cognizant	  of	  the	  
context	  of	  where	  the	  country	  sits	  in	  time	  and	  space.	  	  Achieving	  independence	  from	  a	  
colonial	  power	  after	  WWII,	  communism	  was	  a	  very	  strong	  political	  discourse	  in	  
Myanmar.187	  	  The	  appeal	  to	  a	  working	  class,	  planned	  economy	  with	  equal	  
distribution	  is	  understandable	  when	  considering	  a	  country’s	  experience	  as	  an	  
indigenous	  producing/labor	  class	  serving	  colonial	  benefactors.	  	  “For	  the	  average	  
Burmese,	  at	  the	  root	  of	  colonial	  exploitation	  was	  the	  ruthlessness	  of	  foreign	  capital,	  
the	  cruelties	  of	  the	  world	  capitalist	  order,	  and	  the	  greedy	  intentions	  of	  agents	  of	  
foreign	  companies.”188	  	  These	  factors	  took	  a	  heavy	  toll	  on	  Myanmar	  and	  gave	  rise	  to	  
its	  first	  socialist-­‐leaning	  regime.	  	  The	  first	  regime	  led	  under	  Nu	  devised	  a	  system	  
whereby	  the	  government	  was	  in	  control	  of	  its	  minerals,	  transportation	  and	  
communications	  while	  private	  property	  remained	  a	  fixture.	  With	  these	  moves,	  
however,	  came	  a	  massive	  capital	  flight	  as	  mainly	  British	  investment	  withdrew.	  189	  	  
Nu’s	  regime	  was	  never	  able	  to	  fully	  get	  a	  grasp	  of	  the	  economy	  and	  was	  replaced	  by	  
Ne	  Win	  in	  1962.	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  Perry,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  25.	  
188	  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  81.	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  Id,	  at	  82.	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The	  new	  government	  steered	  Myanmar	  in	  a	  very	  different	  direction	  that	  
involved	  massive	  state	  control.	  	  Ne	  Win’s	  military	  regime	  began	  with	  his	  ideological	  
“Burmese	  way	  to	  Socialism”	  in	  which,	  “Every	  sector	  of	  the	  economy	  was	  to	  come	  
under	  state	  control.”190	  	  However,	  the	  military	  turned	  out	  to	  be	  horrendous	  
economic	  caretakers,	  and	  as	  is	  common	  with	  totalitarian	  military	  regimes,	  they	  
were	  always	  more	  concerned	  with	  holding	  on	  to	  power	  rather	  than	  keeping	  their	  
state	  in	  order.	  	  	  The	  regime	  created,	  “a	  milieu	  of	  fear	  (which)	  so	  pervades	  the	  polity	  
that	  problems,	  some	  obvious	  to	  outside	  observers,	  cannot	  surface	  to	  the	  top	  of	  the	  
intensely	  hierarchical	  and	  command-­‐driven	  military	  structure	  from	  the	  bottom	  of	  
the	  social,	  economic	  and	  political	  ladder.”191	  	  As	  the	  years	  passed	  different	  measures	  
became	  necessary	  to	  keep	  Myanmar’s	  desperate	  economy	  afloat.	  	  The	  first	  forms	  of	  
capitalism	  began	  to	  appear	  in	  1972	  with	  the	  threat	  of	  a	  rice	  shortage	  and	  
skyrocketing	  price.	  	  After	  arresting	  530	  “rice	  hoarders”	  and	  profiteers,	  the	  
government	  “both	  partially	  decontrolled	  the	  rice	  trade	  and	  suspended	  the	  export	  of	  
rice.”192	  	  Anything	  grown	  beyond	  the	  government	  collection	  quota	  was	  made	  
available	  to	  the	  free	  market.	  	  But,	  only	  a	  few	  years	  later	  in	  1976	  the	  country’s	  
economy	  was	  in	  such	  dire	  straights	  that	  it	  took	  loans	  from	  the	  World	  Bank	  for	  the	  
first	  time.193	  	  “The	  Burmese	  economy	  began	  to	  crack	  again	  by	  the	  mid-­‐1980s.	  	  
Between	  1981	  and	  1986,	  the	  national	  debt	  doubled	  to	  US	  $	  2.8	  billion.”194	  	  It	  was	  
only	  two	  short	  years	  between	  these	  conditions	  and	  the	  protests	  that	  stood	  up	  
against	  the	  military	  government.	  	  With	  the	  wave	  of	  unrest	  that	  occurred	  in	  1988	  
coupled	  with	  the	  intensity	  of	  Myanmar’s	  economic	  woes,	  the	  ruling	  military	  was	  
forced	  to	  adapt.	  	  	  	  
The	  road	  to	  globalization	  had	  already	  begun	  even	  if	  the	  regime	  could	  not	  see	  
it.	  	  The	  SLORC	  allowed	  the	  neoliberal	  reforms	  of	  structural	  adjustment	  to	  take	  place,	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  Perry,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  27.	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  Perry,	  supra	  note	  5,	  at	  29	  (quoting	  	  R.I.	  Rotberg,	  Burma:	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  Brook.	  
Inst.	  Pr.	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  (1998).	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  Charney,	  supra	  note	  7,	  at	  136.	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  at	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similar	  to	  the	  many	  other	  transitioning	  regions	  of	  the	  world.195	  	  The	  reforms	  
involved	  liberalizing	  regulations	  and	  foreign	  investment,	  licensing	  private	  banks	  
and	  the	  trading	  of	  foreign	  exchange	  by	  private	  investors.196	  	  Rittich’s	  list	  of	  ‘best	  
practices,’	  privatization	  and	  deregulation,	  was	  set	  in	  action,	  and	  Myanmar	  was	  set	  
on	  the	  road	  towards	  assimilating	  into	  the	  global	  economic	  order.	  	  However,	  the	  
Bank’s	  1995	  assessment	  of	  the	  lack	  of	  positive	  economic	  improvement	  is	  telling	  of	  
the	  policies	  enacted	  7	  to	  8	  years	  prior.	  	  The	  World	  Bank	  admitted	  that,	  
“macroeconomic	  stability	  remains	  elusive,	  as	  indicated	  by	  continued	  internal	  and	  
external	  imbalances.	  	  Inflation	  remains	  high	  and	  variable.”	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  
the	  means	  by	  which	  the	  Bank	  attempted	  to	  achieve	  balancing	  Myanmar’s	  
macroeconomics.	  	  The	  Bank’s	  1995	  policy	  report	  explained	  that,	  “The	  reduction	  in	  
the	  fiscal	  deficit	  has	  been	  achieved	  entirely	  by	  cutting	  expenditures	  (current	  and	  
capital)	  rather	  than	  by	  broadening	  the	  revenue	  base	  or	  improving	  the	  performance	  
of	  SEs[state	  enterprises].”197	  	  By	  cutting	  expenditures,	  the	  government	  enacted	  
austerity	  measures	  that	  could	  and	  would	  never	  benefit	  the	  population.	  	  This	  is	  in	  
spite	  of	  the	  IMF	  and	  the	  State’s	  assuring	  rhetoric	  that,	  “In	  the	  process	  of	  
normalization	  and	  naturalization,	  restructuring	  is	  figured	  as	  a	  large	  scale	  project	  
which	  is	  of	  benefit	  and	  necessity	  to	  all.”198	  	  But,	  this	  has	  proven	  false.	  	  “One	  
consequence	  of	  the	  priority	  given	  to	  efficiency	  enhancement	  and	  wealth	  
maximization	  is	  a	  demotion	  of	  the	  distributive	  dimension	  of	  reforms.”199	  	  In	  a	  
totalitarian	  regime,	  the	  elites	  are	  not	  the	  ones	  who	  feel	  the	  austerity	  measures.	  	  
Those	  who	  were	  already	  impoverished	  in	  Myanmar	  suffered	  under	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  
economic	  reforms,	  which	  were	  only	  to	  get	  worse.	  
	   The	  international	  community	  intensified	  Myanmar’s	  economic	  problems.	  	  
During	  the	  1990s,	  Myanmar’s	  government	  was	  the	  object	  of	  an	  extensive	  sanctions	  
regime	  imposed	  largely	  by	  the	  US	  and	  EU.	  	  In	  response	  to	  this,	  the	  regime	  halted	  its	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  World	  Bank,	  Myanmar:	  Policies	  for	  Sustaining	  Economic	  Reform,	  Report	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  14062-­‐BA	  ii	  (Oct,	  
1995).	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  Id.	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credit	  payments	  to	  the	  International	  Development	  Association	  (IDA).	  	  This	  resulted	  
in	  the	  cancellation	  of	  approved	  current	  and	  future	  loans	  at	  that	  time.200	  	  Myanmar	  
was	  once	  again	  away	  from	  the	  influence	  of	  the	  global	  order.	  	  But,	  it	  was	  absolutely	  
floundering	  economically,	  and	  to	  hold	  onto	  power	  during	  the	  next	  two	  decades,	  the	  
regime	  resorted	  to	  horrendous	  abuse	  of	  its	  people.201	  	  It	  is	  generally	  regarded	  that	  
the	  sanctions	  had	  minimal	  impact	  on	  Myanmar,	  both	  with	  its	  economy	  (which	  may	  
have	  been	  affected	  slightly	  worse)	  and	  the	  impetus	  to	  make	  the	  desired	  changes.	  202	  	  
In	  any	  case,	  the	  status	  quo	  was	  maintained	  while	  China	  and	  other	  regional	  
neighbors	  supplied	  the	  military	  regime	  with	  arms	  and	  provided	  a	  small	  economic	  
lifeline	  to	  the	  Myanmarese	  people.203	  	  It	  may	  not	  have	  been	  the	  sanctions	  that	  were	  
hurting	  the	  economy,	  Myanmar	  had	  other	  states	  to	  do	  business	  with,204	  but	  the	  
massive	  debt	  the	  country	  had	  accumulated	  coupled	  with	  their	  inability	  to	  take	  any	  
more	  loans,	  created	  a	  situation	  in	  which	  there	  was	  simply	  not	  enough	  money	  to	  go	  
around.	  	  	  
Today,	  reengagement	  with	  the	  West	  has	  been	  reinitiated	  and	  Myanmar	  is	  
opening	  up	  even	  further	  after	  nearly	  two	  decades	  of	  distrust.	  	  Before	  it	  could	  fully	  
reengage,	  there	  was	  first	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  tremendous	  amount	  of	  accumulated	  debt	  
that	  the	  regime	  never	  really	  intended	  paying	  off.	  	  	  
The	  presence	  of	  arrears	  presented	  a	  major	  obstacle	  to	  reengagement	  
with	  the	  international	  community.	  	  Of	  Myanmar’s	  total	  debt	  stock	  of	  
US	  $15	  billion	  (estimated	  as	  of	  end	  December	  2012)	  some	  US	  $11	  
billion	  was	  in	  the	  form	  of	  arrears	  that	  had	  accumulated	  during	  the	  
period	  of	  sanctions	  and	  isolation.	  	  The	  bulk	  of	  these	  arrears	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  International,	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  Klaus	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  Thein,	  Business	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  country	  institutions:	  The	  
case	  of	  international	  sanctions	  against	  Myanmar,	  J.	  of	  W.	  BUS.	  (2014),	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  Myo	  Nyun,	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  Good	  
or	  Doing	  Good:	  Inefficacy	  of	  the	  U.S.	  Unilateral	  Sanctions	  Against	  the	  Military	  Government	  of	  
Burma/Myanmar,	  Wash.	  U.	  GLOB.	  STU.	  L.	  R.	  (2008),	  Roman	  David	  and	  Ian	  Holliday,	  International	  
sanctions	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  international	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  political	  development	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  Myanmar,	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(2012).	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(approximately	  92	  percent)	  were	  owed	  to	  Paris	  Club	  debtors,	  and	  
arrears	  to	  Japan	  alone	  were	  65	  percent	  of	  the	  total.	  	  Arrears	  to	  
multilateral	  institutions	  were	  around	  9	  percent	  of	  the	  total,	  with	  5	  
percent	  due	  to	  the	  ADB	  and	  4	  percent	  to	  IDA.205	  
	  
In	  2012,	  the	  Bank	  approved	  a	  pre-­‐arrears	  clearance	  grant	  that	  supports	  a	  
Community	  Driven	  Development	  project.	  	  A	  Development	  Policy	  Operation	  was	  
prepared	  “With	  the	  Bank’s	  Interim	  Strategy	  Note	  for	  Myanmar	  and	  with	  
institutional	  guidelines	  on	  the	  clearance	  of	  arrears.”206	  	  Furthermore,	  other	  
international	  lending	  agencies	  such	  as	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  began	  canceling	  
unpaid	  debt	  and	  allowing	  for	  restructured	  loans	  to	  be	  initiated.207	  	  In	  spite	  of	  this,	  a	  
debt	  percentage	  of	  24.8	  from	  27.3	  still	  remained	  in	  2012.	  	  This	  means	  that	  debt	  
accounts	  for	  a	  quarter	  of	  Myanmar’s	  entire	  economy.208	  	  
Debt,	  however,	  is	  not	  something	  the	  Bank	  is	  concerned	  with	  when	  
attempting	  to	  integrate	  a	  country	  such	  as	  Myanmar	  into	  its	  influence,	  as	  can	  be	  seen	  
by	  its	  willingness	  to	  give	  more	  loans.	  	  In	  2013,	  Myanmar	  signed	  a	  $140	  million	  deal	  
with	  the	  Bank	  in	  order	  to	  pay	  for	  a	  new	  power	  plant	  in	  the	  Mon	  State.209	  	  Along	  with	  
signing	  this	  deal	  Myanmar’s	  government	  gained	  full	  access	  to	  MIGA,	  the	  World	  
Bank’s	  Multilateral	  Investment	  Guarantee	  Agency.	  	  This	  agency	  ensures	  that	  “foreign	  
direct	  investment	  into	  Myanmar	  will	  be	  eligible	  for	  the	  Agency’s	  political	  risk	  
insurance.”210	  	  The	  foreign	  investors	  are	  able	  to	  make	  their	  transactions	  in	  Myanmar	  
without	  worrying	  about	  transfer	  restriction,	  expropriation,	  breach	  of	  contract,	  and	  
non-­‐honoring	  of	  financial	  obligations.	  	  But,	  the	  Myanmar	  government	  must	  first	  
make	  a	  required	  capital	  contribution	  to	  MIGA.211	  	  Myanmar	  essentially	  must	  pay	  for	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membership	  in	  order	  to	  supply	  opportunities	  to	  foreign	  entities	  to	  invest	  in	  its	  
domestic	  operations	  with	  no	  risk	  to	  these	  foreign	  entities.	  	  This	  example	  is	  one	  of	  
many	  “reforms”	  taking	  place	  within	  Myanmar’s	  economy	  and	  legislation.	  
In	  parallel	  with	  the	  reengagement	  comes	  an	  overhauling	  of	  the	  State’s	  
economic	  sector.	  	  Under	  the	  recommendation	  of	  international	  financial	  institutions	  
including	  the	  World	  Bank	  and	  the	  Asian	  Development	  Bank,	  Myanmar	  reordered	  
their	  Foreign	  Investment	  laws	  in	  2012.212	  	  Under	  the	  current	  laws,	  levels	  of	  foreign	  
investment	  are	  demarcated	  in	  which	  foreign	  investors	  can	  own	  up	  to	  100%	  of	  the	  
capital,	  or	  the	  ventures	  can	  be	  a	  joint	  effort	  with	  domestic	  partnerships.213	  	  The	  laws	  
have	  been	  formulated	  to	  offer	  as	  much	  incentive	  to	  investors	  as	  the	  government	  can	  
extend	  without	  losing	  its	  position	  of	  control.	  	  Further	  incentives	  for	  foreign	  
investment	  include	  private	  insurance	  companies	  for	  foreign	  investing,	  tax	  
exemptions	  of	  up	  to	  5	  years,	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  use	  only	  foreign	  currency	  if	  the	  
investor	  so	  chooses.214	  	  Myanmar’s	  economic	  reforms	  are	  being	  done	  under	  the	  
watch	  of	  the	  World	  Trade	  Organization.	  	  The	  WTO’s	  Trade	  Policy	  Review	  claims,	  
“The	  authorities	  state	  that	  trade-­‐related	  domestic	  legislation	  must	  be	  formulated	  in	  
line	  with	  the	  WTO	  Agreements.”215	  	  The	  WTO	  has	  overseen	  the	  law	  reforms	  
previously	  mentioned	  as	  well	  as	  other	  new	  laws	  such	  as	  a	  new	  Telecommunications	  
law	  enabling	  the	  liberalization	  of	  the	  sector,	  a	  consumer	  protection	  law,	  and	  a	  SMEs	  
law.216	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  government	  has	  opened	  up	  international	  banking	  services	  
that	  allow	  for	  private	  banks	  that	  to	  wire	  transfers	  and	  approve	  credit	  for	  trade.	  	  The	  
government	  has	  also	  removed	  its	  “export-­‐first	  policy”	  which	  stipulated	  that	  imports	  
be	  paid	  with	  the	  profits	  made	  from	  exports.217	  	  The	  report	  quotes,	  “The	  economic	  
reform	  process	  continues	  and	  is	  focused	  on	  removing	  further	  regulatory	  restrictions	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to	  trade	  and	  investment,	  improving	  the	  provision	  of	  essential	  backbone	  services,	  
and	  reducing	  corruption	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  Myanmar’s	  business	  environment.”218	  
It	  is	  very	  important	  to	  the	  neoliberal	  agenda	  to	  keep	  the	  two	  spheres	  -­‐	  
economy	  and	  politics	  -­‐	  separate.	  219	  It	  is	  how	  the	  progress	  narratives	  are	  able	  to	  
exist	  and	  drive	  the	  momentum	  of	  change.	  	  However,	  the	  reality	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  state’s	  
government	  and	  legislature	  that	  ultimately	  enact	  the	  legislation.	  	  But,	  other,	  
stronger	  institutions	  such	  as	  the	  World	  Bank,	  Asian	  Development	  Bank	  and	  WTO	  
can	  heavily	  influence	  these	  state	  institutions.	  	  As	  the	  Initiatives	  in	  Legal	  and	  Judicial	  
Reform	  report	  by	  the	  Bank	  makes	  clear,	  certain	  laws	  are	  initiated	  by	  the	  Bank	  as	  a	  
conditionality	  for	  the	  loans	  that	  it	  is	  willing	  to	  give	  a	  state.	  	  The	  Bank	  does	  not	  
finance	  the	  actual	  legal	  work	  that	  takes	  place,	  but	  rather	  the	  country’s	  balance	  of	  
payments.	  	  It	  is	  meant	  to	  happen	  in	  a	  short	  period	  of	  time,	  but	  they	  can	  come	  in	  a	  
series	  of	  adjustment	  loans	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  last	  a	  period	  of	  years.220	  	  This	  means	  
that	  not	  only	  is	  the	  experience	  a	  one	  time	  shock	  between	  the	  state	  and	  global	  
institutions,	  but	  it	  is	  an	  ongoing	  process	  where	  the	  international	  financial	  
institutions	  are	  able	  to	  extend	  their	  influence	  for	  years	  to	  come.	  
Though	  the	  narrative	  that	  the	  Bank	  gives	  may	  give	  the	  impression	  that	  there	  
is	  a	  separation	  between	  politics	  and	  the	  economy,	  politics	  and	  the	  economy	  are	  
inextricably	  linked.221	  	  Perhaps	  the	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  other	  liberal	  pillars	  such	  as	  
democracy	  and	  human	  rights	  do	  not	  actually	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  capitalism	  and	  
vice	  versa.	  	  Even	  mainstream	  political	  researchers	  have	  posited	  their	  quantitative	  
arguments	  demonstrating	  that	  investment	  is	  influenced	  by	  politics.	  222	  	  In	  a	  study	  
conducted	  by	  Resnick	  regarding	  these	  matters,	  he	  tests	  whether	  investors	  are	  
optimistic	  about	  transition,	  indifferent	  towards	  it,	  or	  pessimistic	  about	  it.223	  	  
Interestingly,	  what	  Resnick’s	  analysis	  determined	  was	  that	  transition	  to	  democracy	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is	  seen	  to	  have	  a	  negative	  effect	  on	  its	  share	  of	  foreign	  direct	  investment.224	  	  	  Resnick	  
makes	  three	  different	  interpretations	  of	  the	  data.	  	  He	  suggests	  that	  democracy	  may	  
lead	  to	  factors	  such	  as	  higher	  labor	  costs	  and	  lower	  stability.	  	  Secondly,	  he	  argues	  
that	  foreign	  direct	  investors	  avoid	  uncertainty	  at	  almost	  any	  cost.	  	  And	  lastly,	  he	  
combines	  the	  two	  to	  make	  the	  point	  that	  autocracies	  provide	  more	  long-­‐term	  
stability	  with	  more	  certainty	  than	  a	  transitioning	  democracy	  can.225	  	  This	  implies	  
that	  the	  impetus	  behind	  the	  engagement	  from	  the	  global	  financial	  institutions	  is	  not	  
to	  support	  the	  transition	  for	  the	  common	  good	  of	  another	  state	  and	  its	  people.	  	  The	  
impetus	  behind	  engagement	  is	  to	  redistribute	  resources	  towards	  more	  powerful,	  
hegemonic	  states	  through	  privatization	  and	  assisting	  international	  corporations.	  	  It	  
is	  the	  financial	  institutions	  and	  the	  foreign	  direct	  investors	  that	  reap	  the	  rewards	  
from	  such	  engagement.	  	  The	  experience	  of	  Myanmarese	  private	  entrepreneurs	  has	  
been	  the	  opposite.	  The	  returns	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  very	  difficult	  to	  acquire	  due	  to	  a	  
lack	  of	  initial	  capital	  and	  the	  unwillingness	  of	  state	  ministries	  to	  privatize	  their	  
enterprises.226	  
Privatization	  has	  had	  further	  harmful	  effects	  on	  much	  of	  Myanmar’s	  massive	  
informal	  economy.	  	  Rittich	  argues	  that	  any	  kind	  of	  reforms	  for	  efficiency	  that	  are	  
made	  will	  also	  impact	  the	  distribution	  of	  wealth.227	  	  “Attempts	  to	  induce	  greater	  
economic	  growth	  through	  restructuring,	  even	  if	  they	  produce	  material	  progress	  for	  
society	  in	  the	  aggregate,	  are	  not	  experienced	  as	  a	  single,	  homogeneous	  event	  nor	  do	  
their	  benefits	  accrue	  evenly	  to	  different	  sectors	  of	  the	  population.”228	  	  This	  problem	  
of	  unequal	  distribution	  seems	  to	  be	  an	  even	  larger	  issue	  in	  states	  such	  as	  Myanmar	  
with	  such	  an	  enormous	  informal	  sector.	  	  Even	  the	  World	  Development	  Report	  from	  
2014	  recognizes	  the	  paradox:	  	  
Benefits	  from	  globalization	  accrue	  more	  to	  the	  formal	  economy	  
because	  informal	  enterprises	  often	  do	  not	  have	  the	  appropriate	  
standards	  and	  qualifications	  from	  the	  suppliers’	  standpoint	  to	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  U	  Thein	  Tun,	  Experiences	  of	  Myanmar	  Privatization	  Programme,	  Project	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  and	  Progress	  
Reporting	  Department,	  Ministry	  of	  National	  Planning	  and	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  (this	  article	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  accessed	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compete.	  	  Economies	  with	  high	  rates	  of	  informality	  are	  thus	  often	  
positioned	  at	  the	  lower	  end	  of	  the	  global	  value	  chain,	  and	  their	  
workers	  are	  more	  vulnerable	  to	  global	  shocks	  and	  less	  likely	  to	  
benefit	  from	  opportunities.	  	  Recent	  research	  suggests	  that	  
globalization	  has	  contributed	  to	  the	  prosperity	  of	  many	  countries,	  
although	  sometimes	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  rising	  inequality.229	  
	  	  
Unfortunately,	  these	  informal	  sections	  of	  society	  that	  thrive	  off	  of	  economic	  sectors	  
such	  as	  agriculture,	  retail	  and	  transport	  suffer	  something	  of	  a	  double	  bind:	  they	  do	  
not	  receive	  the	  benefits	  of	  globalization	  while	  they	  are	  often	  the	  ones	  bearing	  the	  
brunt	  of	  the	  economic	  risk.	  	  “Overall,	  globalization	  exposes	  enterprises	  to	  
competition	  in	  the	  world	  market,	  providing	  incentives	  for	  productive	  enterprises	  to	  
expand	  and	  pressures	  for	  unproductive	  ones	  to	  exit.”230	  	  It	  is	  the	  informal	  market	  
typically	  residing	  in	  poorer	  countries	  such	  as	  Myanmar	  that	  the	  Bank	  assumes	  are	  
the	  unproductive	  ones.	  	  The	  Bank	  itself	  acknowledges	  that	  trends	  in	  globalization	  
have	  been	  harmful	  towards	  countries	  with	  highly	  informal	  economies.	  	  Yet,	  its	  
response	  to	  this	  is	  to	  devise	  policies	  and	  techniques	  in	  which	  the	  unproductive	  
informal	  sectors	  can	  be	  alleviated	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  efficiency	  of	  formal	  markets,	  which	  
then	  compliment	  the	  globalized	  economy.	  
	   The	  neoliberalizing	  of	  Myanmar’s	  economy	  has	  not	  brought	  the	  results	  that	  
the	  liberals	  in	  Myanmar	  have	  been	  hoping	  for.	  	  The	  neoliberal	  economic	  system	  is	  
one	  of	  universal	  practices	  that	  involve	  development	  through	  the	  global	  financial	  
institutions,	  privatization	  and	  limited	  state	  involvement.	  	  This	  section	  demonstrated	  
that	  the	  slow	  history	  of	  Myanmar’s	  liberalization	  has	  not	  produced	  its	  desired	  
results.	  	  The	  involvement	  with	  international	  financial	  institutions	  has	  resulted	  in	  
tremendous	  debt,	  and	  privatization	  has	  benefited	  the	  external	  world	  while	  further	  
disadvantaging	  Myanmar’s	  vast	  informal	  sector.	  	  The	  neoliberalizing	  of	  Myanmar’s	  
economy	  has	  resulted	  in	  optimism	  for	  the	  contingencies	  that	  a	  liberal	  economy	  can	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offer.	  	  But,	  the	  optimism	  these	  contingencies	  engender	  will	  not	  benefit	  Myanmar	  as	  
a	  state	  or	  people.	  
	  
C.	  The	  False	  Contingencies	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Myanmar	  
Much	  of	  the	  media	  attention	  Myanmar	  has	  received	  over	  the	  last	  two	  decades	  has	  
been	  in	  regards	  to	  its	  many	  grave	  human	  rights	  abuses	  perpetrated	  largely	  by	  the	  
government.	  	  The	  military	  regime	  has	  a	  miserable	  history	  of	  committing	  horrendous	  
acts	  against	  its	  people.231	  For	  example,	  in	  2015,	  there	  are	  around	  900,000	  internally	  
displaced	  people,232	  which	  is	  largely	  due	  to	  the	  ethnic	  conflicts	  going	  on	  in	  various	  
locations	  of	  the	  state.233	  	  Within	  the	  camps	  of	  the	  displaced	  peoples,	  conditions	  are	  
terrible.	  	  Restrictions	  on	  movement	  exacerbate	  the	  problems	  these	  displaced	  people	  
have	  in	  acquiring	  necessities	  such	  as	  food,	  water,	  education	  and	  medicine.234	  	  Land	  
rights	  issues	  abound	  with	  land-­‐grabbing	  and	  eviction	  taking	  place	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  
the	  Rhakine	  state.235	  Because	  of	  circumstances	  like	  these,	  the	  liberal	  activist	  in	  
Myanmar	  champion	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  hopes	  for	  change.	  
This	  section	  will	  demonstrate	  that	  there	  is	  yet	  again	  a	  similar	  dynamic	  to	  
both	  Myanmar’s	  democratization	  and	  economic	  neoliberalization	  with	  its	  rule	  of	  
human	  rights	  law	  and	  how	  an	  international,	  universal	  approach	  creates	  false	  
contingencies	  that	  are	  unable	  to	  be	  realized.	  	  The	  limited	  human	  rights	  of	  a	  state	  like	  
Myanmar	  has	  become	  unacceptable	  in	  the	  age	  of	  international	  rights	  agencies	  and	  
international	  organizations.	  	  Many	  liberals	  would	  argue	  that	  giant	  strides	  have	  been	  
made	  given	  the	  gains	  made	  in	  the	  civil	  rights	  arena	  with	  the	  elections	  of	  2010,	  which	  
give	  hope	  towards	  a	  further	  developing	  democratic	  apparatus.	  	  They	  also	  draw	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  UN	  critical	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  reforms,	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September	  (2014),	  Freedom	  House,	  Freedom	  of	  the	  Press	  2014	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  Burma,	  12	  September	  (2014),	  
Minority	  Rights	  Group	  International,	  State	  of	  the	  World's	  Minorities	  and	  Indigenous	  Peoples	  2014	  -­‐	  
Burma,	  (Jul,	  2014).	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  available	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attention	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  free	  speech	  has	  been	  made	  more	  possible.236	  	  Furthermore,	  
there	  is	  also	  the	  recently	  enacted	  Myanmar	  National	  Human	  Rights	  Commission	  in	  
2014.237	  	  But,	  these	  gains	  have	  actually	  only	  brought	  about	  changes	  exceedingly	  
limited	  in	  scope.	  	  The	  promise	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  Myanmar	  is	  a	  false	  contingency	  for	  
its	  liberal	  activists	  because	  human	  rights	  limit	  the	  view	  of	  what	  Myanmarese	  
citizens	  are	  actually	  capable	  of	  receiving	  from	  their	  ruling	  body.	  
Before	  discussing	  Myanmar’s	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  there	  first	  needs	  to	  
be	  a	  discussion	  about	  what	  rights	  are	  universally	  subscribed	  to	  and	  forced	  on	  
Myanmar	  and	  which	  are	  ignored.	  	  	  Lisa	  Brooten	  focuses	  on	  the	  dialogue	  shared	  by	  
the	  human	  rights	  indices,	  the	  public	  and	  the	  government	  regarding	  the	  move	  
towards	  stronger	  human	  rights	  in	  Myanmar.238	  	  	  One	  of	  her	  arguments	  is	  that	  the	  
indices	  give	  a	  skewed	  picture	  of	  the	  rights	  discourse	  within	  a	  given	  case.	  	  She	  argues	  
that	  these	  indices	  are	  used	  to	  promote	  a	  narrow	  version	  of	  universal	  human	  rights	  
that	  focuses	  on	  the	  individual	  and	  civil	  rights.	  	  What	  they	  do	  not	  reveal	  is	  the	  social	  
and	  economic	  rights.	  	  This	  can	  give	  a	  false	  image	  of	  what	  the	  politics	  in	  a	  state	  is	  
actually	  impacting.	  	  She	  posits	  that	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  global	  North’s	  control	  over	  
what,	  exactly,	  universal	  human	  rights	  should	  encompass.	  	  Instead	  of	  demonstrating	  
the	  importance	  of	  socio-­‐economic	  freedoms	  and	  rights,	  the	  discourse	  is	  based	  
primarily	  on	  civil	  rights,	  which	  gives	  a	  false	  impression	  that	  civil	  liberties	  are	  the	  
only	  ones	  that	  matter.	  	  This	  in	  turn	  gives	  a	  false	  impression	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  
liberties	  actually	  taking	  place	  in	  states	  such	  as	  Myanmar.239	  	  What	  can	  be	  seen	  from	  
Brooten’s	  work	  is	  the	  incoherence	  in	  a	  state	  between	  the	  gains	  made	  from	  civil	  or	  
political	  reforms	  and	  the	  lack	  thereof	  in	  the	  socio-­‐economic	  betterment	  of	  actual	  
Myanmarese.	  	  Socio-­‐economic	  rights,	  which	  include	  many	  of	  the	  life	  requirements	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Myanmarese	  desperately	  need,	  are	  not	  a	  priority	  in	  these	  indices	  because	  they	  do	  
not	  fit	  into	  the	  universal	  subscription	  of	  human	  rights	  priority.	  
	   In	  March,	  2014,	  Myanmar	  passed	  the	  law	  enabling	  the	  Myanmar	  National	  
Human	  Rights	  Commission.240	  	  Its	  purpose	  is	  to	  protect	  the	  rights	  enshrined	  in	  
Myanmar’s	  new	  constitution,	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  UNHDR,	  protect	  the	  rights	  of	  
other	  international	  conventions,	  and	  to	  engage	  with	  NGOs	  and	  regional	  
organizations	  that	  deal	  with	  human	  rights.241	  	  However,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  this	  
Commission	  is	  a	  red	  herring	  that	  distracts	  attention	  away	  from	  the	  very	  real	  issues	  
the	  state	  has	  with	  inflicting	  violence	  on	  its	  people.	  	  For	  instance,	  the	  funding	  and	  
appointments,	  like	  Than	  demonstrates,	  are	  coordinated	  by	  the	  executive	  branch.242	  	  
This	  is	  a	  very	  unfortunate	  aspect	  to	  the	  Commission	  because,	  as	  John	  Southalan	  
demonstrates,	  “The	  first	  requirement	  for	  independence	  is	  legal	  and	  operational	  
autonomy.	  The	  NHRI	  must	  have	  the	  power	  to	  operate	  on	  its	  own	  and	  to	  be	  able	  to	  
force	  others	  to	  cooperate	  if	  they	  will	  not	  freely	  do	  so.”243	  	  If	  the	  Commission	  is	  in	  the	  
hands	  of	  the	  executive	  branch,	  and	  the	  executive	  branch	  is	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  
military,	  then	  there	  can	  be	  no	  transformation	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  Myanmar.	  	  	  
	   The	  fact	  that	  the	  human	  rights	  commission	  is	  mere	  window	  dressing	  should	  
not	  actually	  be	  of	  utmost	  concern	  to	  the	  liberal	  movement	  of	  Myanmar.	  	  What	  
should	  be	  of	  concern	  is	  how	  a	  human	  rights	  commission	  such	  as	  this	  one	  can	  take	  
the	  focus	  off	  of	  the	  very	  real	  political/economic	  issues	  already	  discussed	  in	  this	  
paper.	  	  Human	  rights	  are	  a	  portion	  of	  law	  that	  fits	  entirely	  within	  the	  package	  of	  
neoliberalism	  that	  has	  been	  discussed.	  	  It	  is	  necessitarian	  thinking	  that	  the	  only	  way	  
to	  protect	  human	  rights,	  private	  property	  and	  democracy	  is	  through	  legislation	  of	  
commissions	  that	  the	  regime	  barely	  acknowledges.244	  	  It	  at	  once	  suggests	  Unger’s	  
list	  of	  three	  forms	  of	  necessitarrian	  thinking:	  the	  closed	  list,	  indivisibility	  and	  
determinist	  idea.	  	  It	  is	  a	  closed	  list	  because	  the	  Commission	  allows	  the	  government	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  Burma	  Partnership	  and	  Equality	  Myanmar,	  Burma:	  All	  the	  President’s	  Men,	  Burma	  Partnership	  and	  
Equality	  Myanmar	  12	  (2014).	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  Id,	  at	  14.	  
242	  Id,	  at	  16.	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  John	  Southalan,	  Military	  Regime	  to	  Establish	  Base	  on	  Mars…Or	  a	  Human	  Rights	  Commission,	  5	  
LEGAL	  IS.	  	  BURMA	  J.	  (2000).	  
244	  Burma	  Partnership	  and	  Equality	  Myanmar,	  supra	  note	  240.	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to	  be	  the	  definers	  in	  what	  is	  and	  isn’t	  a	  “right”	  in	  Myanmar.	  	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  an	  
indivisible	  idea	  because	  it	  has	  only	  become	  relevant	  with	  this	  most	  recent	  transition	  
in	  which	  it	  is	  merely	  another	  factor	  in	  the	  overall	  neoliberalizing	  of	  Myanmar.	  	  
Finally,	  it	  is	  determinist	  because	  it	  is	  of	  the	  general	  faith	  that	  human	  rights	  are	  
“natural”	  and	  therefore	  universal.	  	  What	  the	  people	  of	  Myanmar	  do	  not	  need	  is	  a	  
piece	  of	  legislation	  telling	  them	  what	  they	  should	  be	  entitled	  to.	  	  What	  the	  people	  of	  
Myanmar	  need	  are	  things	  like	  a	  more	  stable	  economy,	  housing,	  water	  and	  
electricity.	  	  The	  Myanmarese	  need	  a	  government	  that	  does	  not	  treat	  them	  like	  
subjects	  to	  do	  what	  it	  wants	  with,	  but	  a	  government	  that	  is	  there	  to	  support	  the	  will	  
and	  needs	  of	  its	  people	  in	  a	  fashion	  that	  the	  people	  deem	  appropriate	  and	  necessary.	  	  
In	  order	  for	  this	  to	  be	  more	  possible,	  the	  global	  community	  needs	  to	  stop	  forcing	  
systems	  that	  give	  false	  securities	  and	  hope	  for	  changes	  that	  do	  not	  manifest.	   	  
	   61	  
VI.	  	  Conclusion	  
A	  look	  at	  Myanmar’s	  transition	  is	  very	  useful	  in	  today’s	  context.	  	  In	  many	  ways,	  the	  
transitions	  of	  today	  occur	  for	  very	  similar	  reasons	  as	  the	  transitions	  of	  the	  past.	  	  
They	  often	  result	  from	  a	  refusal	  of	  the	  people	  to	  accept	  the	  space	  the	  government	  
has	  made	  for	  itself	  politically	  or	  economically	  and	  they	  revolt.	  	  However,	  transition	  
has	  seemingly	  changed	  in	  that	  it	  no	  longer	  results	  in	  immediate,	  radical	  reversals	  of	  
systems,	  in	  fact:	  
The	  idea	  of	  revolution	  has	  become	  a	  pretext	  for	  its	  opposite.	  	  Because	  
real	  change	  would	  be	  revolutionary	  change,	  and	  revolutionary	  change	  
is	  unavailable,	  and	  would	  be	  too	  dangerous	  if	  it	  were	  feasible,	  we	  are	  
left	  to	  humanize	  the	  inevitable.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  project	  of	  a	  pessimistic	  
reformism	  resigned	  to	  soften,	  especially	  through	  compensatory	  
redistribution	  by	  tax-­‐and-­‐transfer,	  what	  it	  despairs	  of	  challenging	  and	  
changing.	  	  Such	  is	  the	  program	  of	  gradual	  adjustment	  instead	  of	  ‘shock	  
therapy,’	  of	  a	  modicum	  of	  social	  protection	  rescued	  from	  the	  
inevitable	  weakening	  of	  workers’	  rights,	  of	  a	  softer	  version	  of	  the	  
other	  side’s	  political	  point.245	  
	  
Neoliberalism	  and	  its	  narratives	  of	  progress	  have	  taken	  transition	  and	  bent	  it	  to	  its	  
own	  liking.	  	  Neoliberalism	  has	  created	  a	  dynamic	  of	  false	  necessities	  and	  false	  
contingencies	  that	  manipulate	  transition	  to	  the	  international	  community’s	  universal,	  
neoliberal	  will.	  	  This	  results	  in	  countries	  like	  Myanmar	  going	  through	  an	  
insubstantial	  transition.	  
	   This	  paper	  has	  traced	  this	  dynamic	  of	  power	  by	  utilizing	  Unger’s	  and	  Marks’s	  
false	  necessities	  and	  false	  contingencies.	  	  I	  first	  displayed	  the	  general	  liberal	  thought	  
regarding	  transition	  and	  the	  global	  North’s	  faith	  in	  the	  liberal	  project.	  	  I	  
demonstrated	  that,	  in	  recent	  history,	  the	  tenets	  of	  liberalism,	  rule	  of	  law,	  democracy,	  
and	  capitalism,	  have	  been	  neoliberalized.	  	  With	  the	  next	  chapter,	  I	  demonstrated	  
how	  neoliberalism	  and	  narratives	  of	  progress	  have	  created	  the	  dynamic	  of	  power	  
that	  is	  the	  result	  of	  false	  necessities	  and	  contingencies.	  	  This	  dynamic	  has	  had	  a	  
tremendous	  influence	  on	  all	  three	  tenets	  of	  liberalism.	  	  Finally,	  I	  demonstrated	  this	  
dynamic	  using	  the	  currently	  transitioning	  state	  of	  Myanmar.	  	  By	  analyzing	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  Unger,	  supra	  note	  29,	  at	  20.	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Myanmar’s	  transition,	  it	  can	  be	  seen	  how	  neoliberalist,	  universal	  policies	  have	  
created	  false	  contingencies	  in	  Myanmar’s	  project	  of	  democratization,	  liberalizing	  of	  
markets,	  and	  writing	  of	  a	  human	  rights	  commission.	  
	   The	  human	  rights	  commission	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  culmination	  of	  the	  entire	  
dynamic	  this	  paper	  has	  strived	  to	  explore.	  	  It	  represents	  how	  the	  universal	  approach	  
of	  law	  can	  actually	  be	  used	  to	  limit	  the	  contingencies	  of	  a	  transitioning	  state	  such	  as	  
Myanmar.	  	  Myanmar	  is	  not	  part	  of	  Western	  Europe	  or	  North	  America;	  it	  has	  not	  had	  
the	  same	  history,	  same	  culture,	  same	  religion,	  or	  governing	  systems.	  	  Their	  ideas	  of	  
what	  rights	  are	  inherent	  to	  their	  being	  are	  very	  likely	  different	  from	  those	  in	  the	  
West.	  	  Much	  like	  their	  ideas	  of	  what	  kind	  of	  economy	  or	  governing	  system	  is	  most	  
appropriate	  for	  Myanmar	  are	  likely	  very	  different	  from	  the	  international	  
community’s	  ideas	  for	  Myanmar.	  	  Unfortunately,	  Myanmar	  is	  a	  state	  with	  very	  little	  
international	  sway	  or	  power.	  	  They	  are	  not	  a	  part	  of	  the	  hegemony.	  	  They	  have	  
resisted	  the	  hegemony	  for	  half	  a	  century.	  	  But	  in	  this	  transition,	  Myanmar	  is	  
reconciling	  with	  the	  international	  community	  and	  its	  hegemonic	  institutions.	  	  These	  
institutions	  follow	  a	  universalist	  ideology	  founded	  on	  a	  narrative	  of	  grand	  progress	  
inspired	  by	  the	  ideals	  of	  liberalism.	  	  These	  institutions	  have	  further	  embraced	  a	  
much	  more	  hardline	  approach	  to	  these	  ideologies,	  what	  we	  call	  neoliberalism.	  	  
Neoliberalism	  has	  thrust	  the	  economy	  into	  the	  front	  of	  all	  priorities	  for	  global	  order.	  	  
It	  utilizes	  its	  falsely	  necessary	  narratives	  and	  ideologies	  to	  create	  a	  dynamic	  of	  false	  
contingency	  such	  as	  how	  a	  human	  rights	  commission	  can	  prevent	  more	  
contingencies	  for	  what	  people	  deserve	  by	  limiting	  the	  conversation	  about	  what	  
rights	  they	  deserve.	  
	   False	  contingency,	  is	  at	  its	  heart,	  a	  power	  dynamic.	  	  By	  affording	  a	  state	  and	  
its	  people	  the	  belief	  in	  contingencies	  that	  are	  not	  actually	  available,	  the	  hegemony	  
effectively	  places	  blinders	  over	  the	  eyes	  of	  the	  less	  powerful.	  	  The	  scope	  is	  limited	  
from	  the	  outset.	  	  It	  is	  the	  international	  community	  that	  shapes	  many	  of	  Myanmar’s	  
ideas	  of	  what	  humans	  should	  inherently	  be	  entitled	  to.	  	  It	  is	  an	  insidious	  process,	  
however,	  because	  it’s	  done	  through	  systems	  like	  democracy,	  free	  markets,	  and	  
human	  rights	  that	  appear	  to	  be	  inherently	  open	  to	  contingencies.	  	  But,	  as	  this	  paper	  
has	  demonstrated,	  neoliberal	  practices	  such	  as	  the	  separation	  of	  the	  state	  and	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economy,	  privatization	  and	  deregulation,	  are	  actually	  limiting	  forces	  on	  the	  
contingencies	  that	  Myanmar	  should	  actually	  have.	  	  This	  effectively	  leaves	  power	  in	  
the	  hands	  of	  the	  international	  organizations	  such	  as	  the	  UN	  or	  World	  Bank	  over	  a	  
state	  such	  as	  Myanmar.	  	  This	  entire	  dynamic,	  in	  turn,	  makes	  the	  contingencies	  of	  
Myanmar’s	  transition	  false.	  
	  
